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Preface
The recent economic policy debate in developing countries has been
characterized by a renewed interest in regional economic integration as a
means of stimulating growth and facilitating structural adjustment. In
particular, in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America several attempts
have been made to revitalize existing integration schemes and to create
new ones. Against this background, the purpose of this study is to
evaluate the economic rationale of various integration attempts, to review
the experience with major integration schemes and their operation over
the last thirty years, and to provide suggestions for successful regional
cooperation.
The analysis presented in the study expands and updates earlier
work by Rolf J. Langhammer. It has greatly benefited from collaboration
with the World Bank. Vinod Thomas, Kazi Matin and Andras Inotai provi-
ded intellectual support, useful background material and helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft. Their assistance is gratefully acknowledged.
Thanks are also due to Ingrid Lawaetz for the careful typing of the
final manuscript. Bernhard Klein and Sylvia Ktinne of the editing staff
deserve credit for painstakingly preparing the manuscript for publi-
cation.
Kiel, May 1990 Horst SiebertA. Concepts and Definitions
For almost three decades regional integration among developing
countries (RIDC) has been on the agenda of their governments. Though
it often remained open whether regional integration should serve as an
instrument or should be the target itself, perceptions were mostly af-
firmative: voices opting against regional integration were rare and almost
all politicians argued that cooperation - another catchword for region-
alism - was per se conducive to economic development of individual mem-
ber countries.
Historically, it has mainly been the group of Latin American coun-
tries which has taken a positive stance towards privileges and preferen-
ces for neighbouring countries since the 1950s. In Latin America, re-
gional integration was mainly intended to surmount the limits to import
substitution in narrow domestic markets and to gain competitiveness
before meeting the challenges of world markets.
In Sub-Saharan Africa the point of departure was completely differ-
ent. Large colonial entities were split into politically independent but
economically very fragile units which inherited a large number of common
instruments and institutions such as language, tax systems, tariffs,
currencies, physical infrastructure, to mention but some of them. What
was largely missing was a network of interstate communication and trans-
portation so that natural protection of small local industries in the newly
founded states remained high. Contrary to Latin America, there was a
high level of institutional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa at inde-
pendence which was threatened by the priority of the new governments
for nation-building and national autonomy.
Historical patterns in the Middle East and Asia were again different
from those in the two other regions. Given the extreme heterogeneity of
the countries in terms of market size, resource endowment and level of
income as well as their often conflicting positions in political ideologies
and economic order systems, common economic targets were very difficult
to define. Conflicts and divergences could be much more frequently
observed than consensus and convergences. This holds both for compro-
mising on positions towards third countries as well as for formulating
common regional economic issues. Under such conditions, countries in theMiddle East and Asia have found it much more difficult to establish a
platform for regionalism.
One of the characteristics of early approaches to regional integra-
tion has been the lack of conceptual clarity as well as the inappropri-
ateness of concepts applied. As far as concepts were concerned, integra-
tion and cooperation often appeared as synonyms in arrangements of
regional groupings and/or were simultaneously labelled as a process and
as a status. However, a distinction has to be made between integration
and cooperation [Balassa, 1976]: integration is a process aiming at abo-
lishing discrimination between local and foreign goods, services, and
factors. This process runs through at least four stages: free trade area,
customs union, common market, and economic union. The sequence of
these stages is not binding, but experience suggests to start integration
by removing barriers to trade in goods (and services) between partner
countries while each partner maintains its national tariff towards non-
member countries (free trade area). The second stage is based on the
first one and comprises the harmonisation of national tariffs against third
countries to a common external tariff (customs union). Liberalising the
circulation of factors of production within the customs union then leads
to a common market, while the harmonisation of remaining national eco-
nomic policies characterises the fourth stage, the economic union. Final-
ly, countries may opt for total economic integration with a supranational
authority [Balassa, 1962, p. 2].
Contrary to integration, cooperation includes concerted actions
aimed at lessening discrimination in certain areas of common interest.
Cooperation is thus much more limited in scope than integration.
The second shortcoming has emerged from a "fallacy of transposi-
tion". The historically unique example of the integration process in the
EEC between 1957 and 1968 when the first two stages of integration were
implemented simultaneously served as a model. Governments of developing
countries misunderstood this process as a case of limited cooperation
without surrendering national sovereignty and tried to copy the example
in their countries. However, many initial conditions conducive to inte-
gration in Europe had been overlooked by governments of developing
countries: e.g. a high level of intraregional trade before integration was
started; similarities in income and industrialisation levels allowing for
intraindustry specialisation; political congeniality in foreign affairs;
capability and willingness to provide compensation payments.It has taken quite a long time for developing countries to accept
the fallacy of transposition and to draw lessons. The intention of this
study is to show why the European way to integration did not work in
developing countries and which alternative avenues to integration have
been pursued. The second chapter elaborates the rationale of regional
integration and makes a distinction between expected economic benefits
and those which were conceived as non-economic benefits. Chapter C
scrutinises manifold barriers to integration (natural, political, economic,
and politico-economic barriers). Chapter D highlights the empirical ex-
perience of major integration schemes by concentrating on recent trends
and reasons for changes. Why most schemes failed to meet even modest
expectations is summarised in Chapter E. Here again, political reasons
for failure are given much attention in order to take account of the emi-
nently political process of surrendering national sovereignty. In Chapter
F, attempts are made to draw lessons from the experiences for the scope
of RIDC and potential policy actions by bi- and multilateral donors.B. The Rationale of Regional Integration among Developing
Countries
I. Expected Economic Benefits
1. The "Training Ground" Argument
The Vinerian customs union theory [ Viner, 1950] exposes two
short-run "once and for all" effects of liberalising intraregional trade:
the replacement of domestic production by imports from partner countries
(trade creation) and the replacement of imports from nonmember coun-
tries by those from member countries (trade diversion). Both effects
emerge as a result of liberalising trade among each other and from
changing relative prices between imports from member and nonmember
countries. Viner evaluated trade creation as welfare increasing and trade
diversion as welfare reducing from a world welfare point of view. His
theory provoked an extensive theoretical discussion on additional con-
sumption and production effects of customs unions and alternative as-
sessment criteria (a single country's versus the world's welfare). The
result of this discussion was inconclusive: even a trade-diverting cus-
toms union could be welfare-increasing and a trade-creating union could
be welfare-reducing.
Policy makers in developing countries as well as many scholars
dealing with RIDC dismissed the Vinerian conclusion as irrelevant for
conditions prevailing in the Third World (e.g. because of idle capaci-
ties). They assessed intraregional trade expansion as per se beneficial
2
and even advocated trade diversion. Their main argument was an
assumed positive effect of infant industry protection in a regional union
on quality control, marketing techniques and other prerequisites for
later success on world markets ("training ground" argument). This case
for protecting in particular infant export activities was later on refined
by Morawetz [1974]. He maintains that intraregional trade expansion can
1 Cf. Gehrels [1956/57]; Johnson [b]; Lipsey [1957; I960]; Meade
[1955] and the review article of Krauss [1972].
Cf. e.g. Linder [1966] or the review article of Jaber [1970] and the
literature cited there.promote intraindustrial specialisation through product diversification and
thus may improve the competitiveness of extraregional exports.
2. Enlarging the Size of the Domestic Market and Achieving Economies of
Scale
Reducing costs of investment per unit of output has often been
mentioned as an important benefit of RIDC. Most scholars rate this dy-
namic effect of integration higher than the static trade effects. Em-
pirical studies for developed countries [ Haldi, Whitcomb, 1967] as well as
for developing countries seemed to support this argument, especially for
relatively capital-intensive industries and for developing countries with
2
small domestic markets. The existence of scale economies has, however,
been challenged by e.g. Kahnert et al. [1969, p. 22]. They mention
various counterarguments such as marketing, distribution and trans-
portation costs growing disproportionately with the size of output. Like-
wise, economies of scale might not be connected with the size of the
plant but with the length of the production runs.
3. Improving Resource Allocation and Availability of Resources
To the extent that small domestic markets constrain economic
growth, regional integration is looked upon as an instrument to make
such a constraint less binding. An intraregional division of labour is
expected to be more consistent with the comparative advantages of mem-
ber countries without exposing their economies to the rough competition
in world markets. In addition, RIDC is expected to promote' growth by
expanding the volume of investable funds, i.e. the availability of local
private as well as public savings, and of foreign risk capital [Kahnert et
al. , 1969, p. 26 f. ]. .
Cf. the review by Vaitsos [1978].
2
Cf. Carnoy [ 1972] for Latin American countries and Pearson, Ingram
[ 1980] for the hypothetical case of integration among Ghana and the
Ivory Coast.Yet, the validity of these arguments crucially depends on the full
utilisation of available resources. If resources are idle, the employment
of these resources becomes the relevant problem and not the reallocation
of employed resources. It is likely that in low-income countries this
argument is much more relevant than in middle-income countries of the
Latin American type. Thus, improving resource availability and allocation
as a result of RIDC could mainly be expected for advanced developing
countries with a high degree of resource utilisation. This reflects again
the "fallacy of transposition" as resource utilisation was high in the case
of the EEC.
4. Enhancing Industrialisation
Almost all developing countries have equated the expansion of the
industrial base with rapid economic development. When domestic markets
proved to be too small to allow efficient import substitution as the
starting point of industrialisation, the formation of a regional market was
seen as a way out of this impasse. In economic terms, developing coun-
tries have regarded industrialisation as a rational social choice, and they
were willing to bear the costs of income foregone by not importing from
the cheapest available source or by specialising in activities in which
they do not have comparative advantages. Given this social preference
for industrialisation anything that lowers the cost of additional industrial
capacity increases welfare and contributes to the countries' development
[Johnson, a, pp. 208-210; Cooper, Massell, 1965]. Compared to indus-
trialisation on a domestic basis, RIDC lowers the opportunity costs of
import substitution. The larger the social preference of a country is, the
less important is the Vinerian welfare-reducing effect of trade diversion
for countries entering a regional grouping. However, a problem associat-
ed with RIDC is that opening the domestic market to industrial imports
from member countries entails a sacrifice of domestic industrial capacity
foregone. Such a loss must then be compensated by reciprocal prefer-
ences for industrial products conceded by all member countries. A prac-
tical problem with reciprocity arises since each member country demands
preferences for products in which it enjoys comparative advantages with-
in the grouping. However, the relative resource endowment of participat-ing countries might be such that some countries possess no or few in-
dustrial products which they could produce at lower prices than their
neighbours but enjoy comparative advantages in nonindustrial products.
Under these conditions preferences could not be negotiated on a mutual
basis for the industrial sector. Furthermore, powerful member countries
could exert pressure on weaker partners to provide a market for high-
cost products of the powerful member without offering compensation in
terms of mutual industrial preferences [Johnson, a, p. 209].
Summarising, if intraunion comparative advantages exist within the
industrial sector rather than between the industrial and nonindustrial
sectors, each partner may gain compared to the alternative of national
industrialisation based on import substitution. Otherwise, countries may
see their social preferences violated even if they would gain more in
terms of income or expansion of nonindustrial activities than they lose in
the industrial sector. From an economic point of view, the preference for
industrialisation is a second-best objective and can, therefore, provoke
distributional conflicts among partners. Such conflicts may be the larger,
the more national resource endowments differ between partner countries
and the more uneven the initial stage of industrialisation among member
countries.
5. Joint Production of Public Goods
Joint production of public goods is a matter of cooperation, not of
integration. The benefits obtained from cooperation in producing public
goods depend on how the two constituent characteristics of public goods,
nonexcludability and nonrivalry, can be operationalised. In a narrow
sense, international cooperation is necessary only when pareto-relevant
technological externalities exist, i.e. when production and/or utility
functions of economic agents are interdependent (e.g. the exploitation of
internationally mobile resources such as fish, the environment, radio
waves and the space) and when interdependence results in pareto-sub-
optimal market solutions (overfishing, overpollution). Existing integration
schemes have not yet paid much attention to such public goods. Yet,
recent developments since the establishment of the Law of the Sea sug-
gest that existing integration schemes devote more interest to the jointexploitation of deep sea mineral resources, to fishing regulations but also
to environmental resources labelled as "common heritage of mankind"
such as wildlife protection.
Until now traditional integration schemes have concentrated more on
joint production of borderline cases between public and private goods,
such as joint public services, training, research and production and
maintenance of physical infrastructure. In fact, products with a long
gestation period, high capital coefficients and decreasing marginal costs
are candidates for joint production as they promise large savings of
costs for individual countries compared to parallel production on several
protected national markets under national authority.
In many cases such goods are only available if supranational initi-
atives are launched. Yet, cooperation is susceptible to conflicts about a
"fair" or "equal" distribution of benefits and costs, as well as about
management and locational issues. Such conflicts may even be more pro-
nounced than in an integration scheme since costs and benefits arising
from cooperation are often tangible and pecuniary. At least costs of
cooperation can be measured in a straightforward way and hence serve
politicians as a clear-cut yardstick for assessing the preferability of
participation. Joint production of public goods is particularly prone to
conflicts if a distinction can be made between producing and consuming
countries, e.g. in cases of dams, ports, and other immobile goods and
services. Consuming countries will claim compensation for production
effects foregone, e.g. in terms of privileges concerning access to mana-
gement positions, purchase guarantees at preferential conditions, and
exemptions from costs of maintenance. In total, success in the joint pro-
duction of public goods is to achieve more easily when goods concerned
are genuine public goods rather than disguised private ones.
6. Protection against Adverse Developments in World Markets
Benefits arising from a reduction of the external vulnerability of
developing countries have mainly been envisaged for commodity export
dependent countries [ UNCTAD, d, p. 9]. Regional integration was hypo-
thesised to foster structural change in production from the primary to
the secondary sector and within exports towards manufactured goods.Erratic price fluctuations in commodity markets would then be less detri-
mental for the import capacity and the planning conditions in the coun-
tries concerned.
Lewis [ 1980] has used a similar argument in a much wider context.
In his reasoning, slower growth and rising protectionism in developed
countries would require a new engine of growth for developing coun-
tries. Lewis believes that trade among developing countries in a broad
South-South preference scheme could provide such an engine. However,
this suggestion overlooks that protectionism and economic fluctuations
affect regional trade sometimes even more than trade with industrialised
countries because of distributional conflicts and political disputes. As a
result, an external vulnerability of individual countries applies to re-
gional markets as much as to world markets.
II. Noneconomic Benefits
1. Improving the Collective Bargaining Power vis-a-vis Industrialised
Countries
Raising the collective bargaining power vis-a-vis industrialised
countries is not an end to itself. It serves a purpose which can be of
economic and/or political nature. In economic terms, supply and demand
issues have to be dealt with separately. On the supply side, partners in
RIDC can engage themselves in concerted actions in primary commodity
markets, in forming mini-cartels in order to gain monopoly rents, in
jointly demanding better access to markets of industrialised countries. As
neighbouring countries tend to belong to the same climatic belts and/or
to the same geological areas, the probability that they supply homo-
geneous agricultural and mineral commodities in the same markets is
high. This meets the preconditions for cartelisation which may offer
short-term income gains. It is questionable, though, whether national
authorities have a genuine interest to maintain cartel discipline and
whether they are prepared to sacrifice national gains for the sake of
sustaining a cartel policy. Concerning access to the markets for
manufactures in industrialised countries even regional groupings may
lack sufficient countervailing power to win concessions.10
On the demand side, import demand could be pooled. However, a
joint import policy may be even more difficult to achieve than supply co-
ordination since countries mostly import heterogeneous manufactured
goods, and import requirements of countries differ by income levels.
Furthermore, integration schemes mostly remain small entities in terms of
purchasing power even if they should succeed in bundling their import
demand, e.g. through state trading. They will not be able to build up
monopsonistic positions and enjoy income gains through imposing an
optimum tariff or achieving terms of trade gains through other channels.
Politically, collective bargaining may offer gains in voting power in
international negotiations. In addition, it may enable countries to shift
parts of their defence expenditures to third countries if the latter ones
view regional coherence as an element of their utility function. The same
may hold true for access to foreign aid and other external resources.
Donor countries may save costs if they negotiate with representatives of
a region instead of many countries separately. Generally spoken, region-
alism seems to have more appeal in the political than in the economic
arena because it allows for producing international collective goods like
regional security and because a cosmopolitan alternative to regionalism is
mostly not available.
2. Consensus Building on Regional Political and Security Issues
RIDC may serve as a vehicle to commit neighbouring countries to
common objectives if the direct way of political integration is not feas-
ible. Such objectives are easier to identify if a common actual or per-
ceived external political threat exists. The history of some regional
groupings among developing countries bears witness to this argument,
e.g. the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the South-
ern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Consensus
building about political objectives of common interest requires mutual
consultations and may lead to regional regimes of norms and rules or
even concrete agreements [ Keohane, 1982; Krasner, 1982]. The benefits
which such agreements promise comprise the receipt of mutual political
support and burden sharing in security issues. Such benefits have to be
paid for with restraints in national unilateral policy making and, possib-11
ly, financial contributions to the joint purpose. As long as the balance
between restraints and benefits is positive, consensus building is pro-
fitable from the single country's point of view [cf. in detail Krasner,
1982; Hoffmann, 1983]. In other words, refraining from maximising the
self-interest of individual partners now is conditioned by the expectation
that other partners return this favour when needed in future [Jervis,
1982; Keohane, 1982].
It is important to note that such regional cooperation does not ren-
der the nation-state obsolete. On the contrary, it contributes to its
survival because cooperation strengthens the effectiveness of domestic
policy making. However, regional cooperation may come under pressure
when the external threat vanishes. Then, the relative attractiveness of
individual versus collective actions may change in the way that the
latter does not promise more rewarding results than the former [Hoff-
mann, 1983, p. 34].
3. Provision of a Scapegoat for Unpopular Policy Decisions
Regional integration both in the sense of trade and factor integra-
tion and project-specific cooperation constrains national policies, either
by requiring policy changes or by binding countries not to change exist-
ing policies. Such loss of national sovereignty may prove to be a gain
for individual countries as well as for national policymakers. To start
with the latter, public choice theory and the theory of political economy
suggest that policymakers are rationally acting agents which maximise
their individual benefits rather than those of the community. Giving up
national autonomy to some extent is equivalent to shifting the responsi-
bility for certain policies to some relatively anonymous supranational
body which is more remote from the political clientele than national insti-
tutions. Under the objective of maintaining power it is rational to shift
so-called "dirty jobs" to the supranational body and to deny own re-
sponsibility. These "jobs" are policies which benefit relatively small
interest groups at the expense of the majority of voters such as sector-
specific tariffs and subsidies. A somewhat different viewpoint is pre-
sented by Pelkmans [ 1983; 1986] who argues that sector-specific policies
are important means to redistribute income and, hence, a major instru-12
ment to influence the political clientele. National politicians will seek to
keep such policies under their control and instead shift general economic
policies such as tariff cuts across the board to regional institutions.
Both arguments have in common that policies which are profitable in
terms of being applauded by identifiable voters and pressure groups and
which can be attributed to policy makers will not be delegated to supra-
national bodies. Costs arise, however, if such bodies expand their com-
petence and consequently their demand for resources and if national
governments lose control over them.
As far as the gain for individual countries is concerned, regional
commitments may help to discipline the domestic political opposition
against the removal of national price distortions. Yet, this may require
an additional compensation of groups losing their subsidies. Gains for
countries as well as for politicians may coincide, but do not necessarily
do so.Bibiiothek
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C. Barriers to Integration
I. Natural Barriers
Barriers to RIDC have played an important role in assessing rea-
sons for failures. Such barriers may be rooted in geographical conditions
and/or historical developments. They are frequently mentioned in the
context of low-income regional groupings in Sub-Saharan Africa. Natural
barriers have in common that they are constraints to integration outside
the responsibility of partner countries. If they are prohibitive, regional
integration is nondiscriminatory, that is noneffective (Iceland-New Zea-
land case). Barriers may not only arise from transportation costs, e.g.
Sub-Saharan surface transport, but also from communication costs. Unfor-
tunately, there is no information available on how such costs have
changed over time in RIDC and how they compare to effective rates of
protection. It seems plausible to assume that conditions of surface and
especially air transport have improved in Sub-Saharan Africa since the
late 1960s and early 1970s when they were extremely poor. Lower
natural barriers to trade have exposed local industries to stronger com-
petition from neighbouring countries. Increasing competitive pressure
could induce countries to stop intraregional trade liberalisation and even
to implement new tariffs as substitutes for natural barriers.
Different languages are a passepartout for cultural, legal, admin-
istrative and institutional barriers as the dichotomy between the anglo-
phone and francophone West African countries suggests. As colonial
languages proved to be the instrument for nation-state building and were
used as a tool of governmental rule, governments were not prepared to
introduce vernacular languages spreading across borders or to accept
one common colonial language. Barriers caused by languages, however,
are not unsurmountable or prohibitive. They add to other barriers which
are more binding constraints as the Latin American or North African
experience underlines where RIDC did not suffer from language barriers.
If intraregional trade is mutually profitable the social invention of
agreeing to a common working language in commerce will soon be made
even if governments might subsidise the use of their language in diplo-
Cf. Langhammer [ 1978, pp. 151-159] for estimates of transportation
costs in the Central African Customs and Economic Union (CACEU).14
matic, scientific or political circles. The same will hold for standards and
norms linked to languages.
The colonial heritage as another natural barrier is a catchword for
sustained commercial and political links between the former metropolitan
power and the newly founded states. Economically, it has again material-
ised in Sub-Saharan Africa where the communication and transport net-
work discriminated against intraregional trade. Furthermore, firms from
metropolitan countries retained some monopoly power and could export
manufactures to African countries at prices above those of competitors,
either through tied aid, state trading or through exploiting nontariff
barriers (NTBs) build up against other OECD countries [ Kreinin, 1973;
Ndongko, 1973]. To what extent such monopolies tend to impede intra-
regional trade is difficult to measure since the elasticity of substitution
between products originating from partner countries and from the metro-
politan country can hardly be estimated empirically. Over time, colonial
ties are likely to have decreased in importance, perhaps more visibly in
anglophone than in francophone countries which are still strongly linked
to France through monetary cooperation (Franc Zone).
II. Political Barriers
The majority of developing countries is still in the process of find-
ing national identity. Obviously, this process applies particularly to
African and Asian countries which have aimed at neutralising problems of
multiracial and multitribal societies through a common umbrella of a na-
tion-state. Such a search for identity can constitute an obstacle to
RIDC. Borders gain in importance as the inflow of goods, factors and
ideas will probably be constrained in order to facilitate the finding of
national identity. Under such conditions, neighbouring countries can
become competing units and rivals for scarce internal and external re-
sources. Nationalism may be spurred and border conflicts provoked. The
history of manifold conflicts between developing countries even within
integration schemes bears witness to the relevance of political barriers.
They tend to be the stronger the less costly it appears to intervene into
For a theoretical discussion of measuring elasticities of substitution,
cf. Sawyer, Sprinkle [1989].15
intraregional resource flows, i.e. the less important markets of neigh-
bouring countries are for national economic welfare. In some cases the
good performance of neighbouring countries will serve as a scapegoat for
own failures as politicians tend to argue in terms of a zero-sum game.
Political barriers can also be built up if controversies on funda-
mental issues of the economic order exist. In many developing countries,
an economic order has not been developed through experience, consensus
or "tatonnement", but was inherited from the colonial past or arbitrarily
fixed by the political leaders of newly independent states. Two very
different economic order systems within an integration scheme are pro-
hibitive to consensus building as was shown in East Africa (Tanzania and
Kenya) and to a lesser extent also in Latin America (Peru and Chile).
III. Economic Barriers
Even if natural and political barriers are not important a guarantee
cannot be given for an efficient regional integration as there may be
economic barriers against RIDC. One such barrier is the absolute level
of income. For low-income countries static trade effects as well as dy-
namic production effects will be negligible given the low level of overall
modern industrial activities [ Brada, Mendez, 1983]. Another barrier are
differences between partner countries concerning the income level. They
will in the short run lead to some polarisation as synergy effects will
work in favour of the relatively more advanced partner countries [Vait-
sos, 1978]. Capital will accumulate in more advanced countries, and
labour will tend to migrate. The markets of backward countries are so
small that they can easily be supplied by industries of the advanced
countries which have excess capacities and hence do not need new in-
vestment. Therefore, intraregional trade imbalances in manufactures may
emerge very rapidly if industrial capacities are idle and if trade in
agricultural products between the relatively resource-abundant backward
countries and the relatively capital-abundant central states is not lib-
eralised. Problems of trade imbalances will be exacerbated if no exchange
rate adjustment of backward countries is possible because of their mem-
bership in a monetary union like in francophone West Africa and partly
in Central Africa as well. It is important to note that trade imbalances16
do not indicate that a backward country is worse off compared to non-
membership. The state may be better off but its performance may still
lag behind that of the central state, and this matters politically.
Growing trade imbalances can aggravate the touchy issue of losses
of government revenues in the netimporting backward countries. Such
losses may either occur in the case of trade creation when ceteris pari-
bus the tax base in the importing country shrinks as domestic produc-
tion will be replaced by partner countries' imports. Alternatively, the
state incurs losses of customs revenues if trade is diverted from non-
members to member countries. Given the weak tax base and the depend-
ence of budget revenues on customs especially in low-income countries,
growing trade imbalances will sooner or later provoke the resistance of
netimporters against liberalising intraregional trade.
A further barrier is constituted by different perceptions of regional
industrialisation planning. If decisions on investment in industries of
regional importance are not made by markets but through intergovern-
mental negotiations, different cost-benefit analyses of alternative in-
dustries and industrial locations may prevent consensus.
IV. Politico-Economic Barriers
Economic barriers to RIDC have an additional dimension related to
the economic rationale of policy formulation. Economic theory generally
assumes that utility functions of governments and nations are identical
and that politicians strive to increase the welfare of the population as a
whole. The political economy of government decision making has shown,
however, that governments may pursue objectives such as securing their
own power and influence which are not necessarily in the best interest
of the countries concerned. Similarly, politicians are believed to behave
rationally in the sense that they maximise their own utility e.g. in terms
of bending to the demands of their own electorate sometimes even at the
expense of national welfare. Furthermore, governments and politicians
may have a direct economic stake in public decision making as their own
income and wealth can depend on these decisions to a substantial degree.17
Governments and politicians will evaluate the membership in a re-
gional grouping on the basis of their own net benefit. These may become
negative if RIDC implies only marginal benefits but is achieved only at
substantial costs in terms of political power or income foregone. Such a
cost-benefit calculus may be able to explain why countries have left
regional groupings and why mutually agreed policy decisions are not
implemented in member countries. In the case of nonimplementation,
governments may value membership highly because of associated benefits
derived from common external activities (increased security, attraction of
foreign aid), but they are not prepared to shoulder the costs of opening
up their own markets.18
D. Regional Integration Schemes in Operation
I. Synopsis of Institutional and Economic Developments
Despite substantial differences in historical roots (Section C. I) and
integration philosophy all major integration schemes have aimed at eco-
nomic integration by promoting intraregional trade (Synoptical Table 1).
This target was pursued with varying degrees of ambition. Some schemes
(Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), Preferential Trade Area
for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA), ASEAN) focussed on
preferential trading arrangements, while others (Central American Com-
mon Market (CACM), CACEU, West African Economic Community (WAEO)
intended to go all the way to a common market with a common external
tariff and factor mobility. In addition, the Andean Pact had embarked
upon regional industrialisation programmes to promote a more equitable
regional development.
The achievements of RIDC varied across integration schemes and
over time even more than the means employed (Synoptical Table 1).
Promoting intraregional trade has not or not yet been successful in the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), PTA and ASEAN.
A second group of integration schemes recorded a promising start, but
soon stagnated (LAIA) or even disintegrated again (CACM, Andean
Pact). The relatively most successful schemes were those which could
sustain the integration level inherited from the earlier colonial period
(WAEC, CACEU).
Success or failure in RIDC has, however, not decisively influenced
economic development of member countries of integration schemes. An
outstanding example are the ASEAN countries which on average experi-
enced rapid economic progress although regional integration remained
minimal (Table 1). All in all, the pattern of economic development among
integration schemes rather reflects the impact of external constraints and
domestic policies. Furthermore, economic development became increasingly
imbalanced between member countries of integration schemes as is shown
by high coefficients of variation for major economic indicators (Table 1).
Centrifugal forces have clearly dominated integration efforts. The rea-
sons for these unfavourable developments are discussed in detail in the






Gradual and progressive establish-
ment of an area of economic prefer-
ences with an equity-oriented
three-tier category of more de-
veloped, intermediate and less
developed members, no time
schedule for targets to be achieved








Tariff cuts, common minimum exter-
nal tariff, joint industrial pro-
gramming schemes
In 1987, about 40 per cent of
intra-LAIA imports came under
items eligible for preferences
(Table 2) with intercountry vari-
ations in product coverage.
Tariff cuts in trade in specific
industries between congenial
partners (e.g. Argentina and
and Brazil) are overproportionate
Serious delays and setbacks dur-
ing the 1980s; trade liberalis-
ation programme is rescheduled;
joint industrialisation pro-
grammes failed
Customs union for goods originating Common external tariff, clearing The CACM after a convincing start
in the member countries; removal
of foreign exchange constraints in
intratrade
Customs union for processed goods
originating in the WAEC, compen-
sation for customs revenues fore-
gone. Full dismantling of internal
tariff and NTBs to trade targetted
for the early 1990s
house arrangement
Preference scheme replacing inter-
nal import duties on industrial
goods by the "regional cooperation
tax" which funds a compensation
scheme
in the 1960s disintegrated in the
1970s because of political and
later on economic difficulties;
revitalisation is underway but
the late 1960s stage of inte-
gration has not yet been achieved
Relatively successful in terms of
intraregional trade shares;
intratrade in raw materials is
widely exempt from customs
duties; compensation scheme is
effective, labour mobility is
relatively high. The WAEC, how-
ever, is affected by the general
economic malaise of West African
economies and by growing dispari-






Gradual elimination of TBs and
NTBs on intratrade in manufactur-
ed products over a period of 4 to
10 years, depending on categories
of countries and products. Mutual
trade in agricultural products and
handicrafts is to be totally liber-
alised from the outset
Customs union, free mobility of
labour
Reduction and eventual elimination
of TBs and NTBs on intratrade, re-
moval, ease of restrictions in
transit trade; removal of foreign
exchange constraints in intra-
trade
Preferencial trade area; joint in-
dustrialisation in specific manu-
facturing sub-sectors in regional
joint ventures; improved bargaining
power concerning access to OECD
markets
Cooperation, compensation and de-
velopment fund; technical and
specialised commission for trade,
customs, immigration, monetary and
payments matters; for industry,
agriculture and natural resources
for transport, telecommunication
and energy; and for social and
cultural affairs
"Single tax" as substitute for
customs duties on intratrade; com-
mon investment code; common exter-
nal tariff, solidarity fund
Three-tier preference scheme for
originating products, clearing
house facilities, liability in-
surance scheme for transit trade
Preferential trading arrangement
for selected items, ASEAN Indus-
trial Projects Scheme (AIP), ASEAN
Industrial Complementation Scheme




Trade liberalisation is still awaiting
implementation. Expulsion of ECOWAS
nationals by Nigeria in the mid-1980s
jeopardised efforts towards free move-
ment of labour
Decline in the intensity of integration
compared to the 1960s and early 1970s,
intratrade is low; no progress in
labour mobility; CACEU is outcompeted
by a community which includes Zaire
Major parts of the liberalisation pro-
gramme are not yet implemented, clear-
ing house still lacks attractiveness,
PTA of potential interest for few core
countries only
Preferential trading arrangement has
had little impact on intra-ASEAN trade;
AIPs and AICs failed and AIJVs are
still to be implemented; dialogue with
OECD countries is successful; cohesion
towards third countries and good
individual economic performance puts
modest progress of integration into the
shade; cooperation increasingly
dominates over integration
Source: UNCTAD [ b; c; d]; general literature cited in the bibliography.21
Table 1 - Basic Economic Indicators and Measures of Dispersion of Major
Integration Schemes
















































































































7.6(b) 3.7(b) 6.5(c) 6.3(c)
0.20 0.67 0.39 0.80
(1) = Population 1987 in mill.
(2) = Gross National Product (GNP) per capita 1987 in US $
(3) = Average annual growth of GNP per capita 1965-1987
(4) - Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1987 in mill. US $
(5) = Average annual growth of GDP 1965-1980
(6) = Average annual growth of GDP 1980-1987
(7) = Growth of merchandise exports 1965-1980
(8) = Growth of merchandise exports 1980-1987
(a) Regional average weighted with the population of member countries
1987. - (b) Regional average weighted with the 1987 GDP of member
countries. - (c) Regional average weighted with 1987 merchandise ex-
ports of member countries. - (d) Coefficient of variation: standard
deviation/average of indicators for individual member countries. -
(e) Excluding Equatorial Guinea. - (f) For indicators (4)-(8) exclud-
ing Comoros, Djibouti, and Swaziland. - (g) Excluding Brunei.
Source: World Bank [1989b]; own calculations.22
II. Regional Integration in Latin America
1. The Latin American Free Trade Association
The foundation of the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA/ ALALC) by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru,
and Uruguay in 1960 was the outcome of two different perceptions. On
the one hand, the so-called "cepalismo" view fostered by the Economic
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) gave strong support to regional
import substitution as a countervailing strategy against deteriorating
terms of trade and dependence on imports of capital goods from indus-
trialised countries. On the other hand, vested interests of the large
member countries urged for new markets for local inward-oriented indus-
tries which were not competitive on world markets. Regional preferences
were looked upon as an easy way towards expanding the market frontiers
without bearing the costs of adjusting to world market conditions.
In comparison, the second perception proved to be the dominant
one. This paved the way to distributional conflicts when it became evi-
dent that the benefits from gaining access to markets of neighbouring
countries were unequally distributed given the different stages of indus-
trialisation within LAFTA. The smaller countries did not prove as buoy-
ant absorbers of LAFTA-originating products as were expected by the
net exporters. Consequently, the latter ones did not offer compensation
schemes which would have been one possibility to settle disputes over
unbalanced regional trade. As a result, the time schedule for the com-
pletion of a free trade area soon became obsolete.
Initially, LAFTA members had agreed upon a twelve year transition
period during which the mutual trade barriers were to be dismantled
following item-by-item negotiations in a two-tier approach. So-called
common lists of items eligible for preferential treatment were expected to
be accepted by all members for all members. In addition, each member
was requested to offer national lists of products for which tariffs were
to be reduced by at least 8 per cent after each negotiation round. Some
compensation or transfer elements were introduced through options for
Colombia and Ecuador became members in 1961, Venezuela in 1966 and
Bolivia in 1967.23
member countries to confine preferences to the backward partners within
LAFTA but such preferences did not play a role as no clear-cut defini-
tion on indicators of "backwardness" was agreed upon.
LAFTA in operation failed to achieve all major objectives. Items on
the common list were never fully liberalised and national lists remained
unimportant until they were given up with the foundation of the Andean
Group in 1969. In deviation from the initial focus on trade integration,
industrial cooperation on a bilateral level was initiated from the very
beginning, but it was not until the apparent failure of the free-trade
objective at the end of the 1960s that industrial cooperation moved into
the centre of Latin American integration. It was intended to give an
impulse to industrial policy coordination and to spur the production of
more sophisticated goods not yet traded within LAFTA. Again, as in
trade, bilateral agreements in few sectors were mostly confined to the
Big Three (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) where multinational enter-
prises could organise intrairidustry specialisation across borders
[Balassa, 1979].
Compared to other integration schemes, especially the CACM and
the East African Community (EAC), there is little empirical evidence
available on the effects of LAFTA, probably because of the apparent
failure of the pure trade integration approach pursued by LAFTA. One
hint can be taken from the development of the share of intra-LAFTA
trade in total trade of LAFTA during the early stage of this scheme.
Intra-LAFTA trade shares climbed from 8 per cent in 1960 to 10 per cent
in 1970 and even to 13 per cent in 1980 [ UNCTAD, a]. But what emer-
ges as a success is simply the outcome of rising world market prices of
commodities which would have been traded anyway without tariff prefer-
ences. Trade in commodities (for instance, wheat from Argentina, coffee
from Colombia and Brazil, meat and rice from Uruguay, crude oil from
Venezuela and Mexico, and copper from Peru and Chile) grew faster than
trade in goods subject to LAFTA tariff preferences (so-called negotiated
products). Until the mid-1980s the share of negotiated products in intra-
regional imports of members under the new LAI A preference scheme has
remained low (40 per cent of total intraregional imports in 1986; Table
2). In addition, there were large differences between the advanced
countries (the Big Three) on the one hand, importing up to 58 per cent
of LAIA-originating products under preferential agreements, and the24



















































































































































































































































Source: ALADI [ b, 1988, Nr. 1,5 und 6, 1989, Nr. 1].
backward partners like Paraguay and Bolivia on the other hand which
imported but a very small share of goods from partner countries under
preferential conditions. As a result, more telling than the intraregional
trade share of about 15 per cent in 1988 is the fact that in 1986 nego-
tiated imports comprised no more than 5.9 per cent of total LAIA im-
ports.
Analytically, the question of trade diversion versus trade creation
within LAFTA deserves more attention than the development of intra-25
regional trade shares. Results differ by approaches applied, but there is
evidence for more trade diversion than trade creation (Synoptical Table
Al). For instance, George et al. [1977] estimated import demand func-
tions for each LAFTA country by imports from member and nonmember
countries. They found LAFTA to account for a cumulative increase in
intraregional trade of US $2.6 bill, while diverting imports worth US $
3.9 bill, from nonmember countries. Thus, there was a clear preponder-
ance of trade diversion and even a net trade diverting effect, i. e. a
decrease of total trade in absolute terms (calculated as the difference
between both changes). More recent research applying a shift-share
analysis for manufactured imports of the Big Three in the 1962/63-1978/
79 period strongly supports the hypothesis of trade diversion as the
major source of growth of intra-LAFTA trade [Langhammer, Spinanger,
1984, pp. 56-63].
What is common to all studies is the conclusion that the pure trade
integration process of LAFTA failed to decentralise trade flows in pro-
cessed goods across all member countries and to produce a "training
ground" effect for exporting outside the region as was expected by some
politicians and scholars [e.g. Balassa, 1973, p. 180]. This is confirmed
by empirical analyses provided in Table Al.
2. The Latin American Integration Association
The failure of LAFTA induced Latin American politicians to choose a
new approach of loose cooperation providing scope for differentiated
approaches to intraregional trade liberalisation on a bilateral level. This
strategy mix of cooperation and integration became institutionalised with
the foundation of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA/
ALADI) in 1980. Neither a free trade area nor a uniform regional pre-
ference margin applying to all members across the board was aimed at
but bilateral tariff preferences and regional tariff preferences in some
items for all members. The new concept of LAIA is that of consolidating
and promoting the existing bilateral trade relations instead of subsidising
new import-substitution industries through preferential treatment as it
was intended by LAFTA. This implies a sizeable increase in the variance26
of both preferential trade and access conditions among partner countries.
By 1987, regional preference margins ranged between 4 per cent for ex-
ports of the Big Three to the three smaller partners Bolivia, Ecuador
and Paraguay and 22 per cent for imports of the Big Three from the
countries. As overvalued exchange rates have often rendered tariff
protection ineffective in Latin American countries [e.g. in Argentina, cf.
Wogart, Marques, 1985], there was not much trade expansion to be ex-
pected from preferential tariffs.
The ongoing internal process of differentiation was further accen-
tuated by external challenges relevant for member countries to different
degrees (oil price shock, debt problem) and corresponding internal re-
sponses. In total, efficiency losses of discriminatory trade policies are
likely to be lower in the looser type of LAIA integration than in the
rigid LAFTA type.
Given the severe foreign exchange bottlenecks of the highly in-
debted Latin American countries, the issue of saving foreign exchange
through reciprocal clearing arrangements has received much attention in
LAIA. The LAIA Payments System allows for invoicing intraregional trade
in local currencies and to confine payments in convertible foreign cur-
rency to clearing balances and advance transfers. After two decades of
Payments and Credit Arrangements in operation it has been achieved to
reduce the share of foreign currency transfers in total operations chan-
nelled through the arrangements from 30 per cent in 1966 to 24 per cent
in 1988 (Table A2). Far-reaching expectations with regard to foreign
exchange savings and the reduction of transaction costs had, however,
to be discounted. Neither were savings high in terms of total financial
transactions nor could the arrangements offset trade-policy-induced
impediments to intraregional trade expansion such as the lacking dis-
mantling of NTBs [Fischer, 1983]. Approaches within LAIA to stimulate
barter trade and compensation arrangements in order to save foreign ex-
change [ Hodara, 1985] support the view that clearing arrangements have
failed to ease the foreign exchange constraints. In addition, the
emergence of the debt crisis and the subsequent liquidity constraints in
the mid-1980s led to an extensive use of the regular lines of credits and
to a rapid exhaustion of the credit ceilings. As a result, some member
countries had to clear their debits with each other before the lapse of
the normal 120-day settlement period [ UNCTAD, c].27
Viewed against the objective to expand intraregional trade, LAIA
has not performed better than LAFTA as can be seen from the low pro-
gress in raising the share of items eligible for preferential treatment
[Langhammer, Spinanger, 1984, Table A18; ALADI, a]. Nor can it be
concluded that LAIA has fulfilled the function of a training ground for
gaining extraregional competitiveness better than LAFTA. What can be
said is that in the past LAIA has proved to be a less costly way to
regionalisation than LAFTA. Should, however, a new programme of re-
gional import substitution be put in place on the basis of national lists of
goods imported from third countries and with preference margins raised
substantially - as it had been designed for the end of the 1980s
[ UNCTAD, b, p. 14] - costs would increase again.
3. The Andean Pact
The development of the subgroup within LAFTA/LAIA, the Andean
Pact, mirrors three things: the initial fear of smaller countries to be
overridden by the Big Three, the euphoria of finding an alternative -
more "development-oriented" - approach to integration, and finally, the
disillusions resulting from distributive conflicts which broke out even
within a more homogeneous group of countries than LAFTA was.
The smaller Latin American countries frustrated by the shortcomings
of LAFTA perceived two essentials as guidelines for their genuine ap-
proach to integration: (a) more outward orientation in the regional con-
text than those LAFTA members with a large internal market, and (b)
more elements of planning in the regional industrialisation process in
order to take account of equity considerations. Accordingly, the founda-
tion act, the Cartagena Agreement of 1969 negotiated by Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru (Venezuela followed in 1973) included trade
integration cum "regionally balanced" industrialisation. The former was
envisaged through the formation of a free trade area and later on a
customs union with a common external tariff, whereas the latter target
was to be achieved by regional investment plans (so-called Sectorial
Programs of Industrial Development) and by harmonisation of domestic
policies [Heldt, 1972]. A common treatment of foreign investment (Deci-
sion 24) which included restrictive practices such as an indigenisation28
requirement, limits to profit remittances, and monopolies for national
firms in some sectors marked the beginning of domestic policy coordina-
tion on a regional level.
Both instruments of integration, the common external tariff and re-
gional industrialisation programmes were bound to fail when they con-
flicted with national development plans. Ultimately, they would have
meant a subordination and finally surrender of national sovereignty
which the countries were not willing to endorse. Fundamental disagree-
ments on principles of the economic order such as between Peru and
Chile in the mid-1970s - to mention an extreme case - which led to the
withdrawal of Chile from the Andean Pact in 1976, were only the peak of
the iceberg. Even more congenial countries in the Andean Group pursued
entirely different economic policies and were unprepared to bear the
economic and political costs of policy coordination.
Economically, a common external tariff would have resulted in con-
siderable trade diversion as the initial level of intraregional trade was
low. When the decisions were to be implemented, homogeneity among
member countries proved to be a chimera. The industrially more ad-
vanced member country Colombia strove for a relatively low level of
external protection in order not to penalise its manufactured exports and
to avoid a real appreciation of its currency. On the other hand, Vene-
zuela tried to cope with the negative consequences of the Dutch disease
effect for the competitiveness of its non-petroleum sectors against im-
ports and urged for a high external tariff.
Regional industrialisation by means of attributing specific industries
to specific countries through administrative procedures faced high costs
too. Inefficiencies due to planning which became already visible on the
national level grew substantially when the regional level was involved. A
sacrifice to efficiency criteria for the sake of an equitable distribution of
net benefits could have theoretically been lowered by multinational own-
ership from all members but this would have meant the transfer of
vested interests from the state to the firm level. Factor mobility which
could have eased the problems inherent in regional industrialisation was
never allowed within the Andean Pact. Furthermore, under regional in-
For a lucid summary, cf. Blejer [1986, pp. 20-24].29
dustrialisation employment foregone would have been sizeable in countries
supplying the regional market under high protection since larger pro-
duction runs would have fostered capital-intensive techniques. Thus, the
trend observed in Colombia that intraregional manufactured exports were
much more capital-intensive than extraregional ones would have been
enhanced [Wogart, 1978, p. Ill f. ].
Politically, surrendering national sovereignty proved to be incon-
sistent with ambitious national development programmes and assessments
of national benefits from integration. The result was that (after a
number of internal crises caused by the halt of industrial programming
and the nonimplementation of the common external tariff) conflicts
culminated in 1983 when trade among Andean Pact member states broke
down. Since that time a substantial revision of the Cartagena provisions
is under way. The so-called Quito Protocol of 1987 has set new posi-
tions. Similar to LAI A, new plans are less ambitious and give more scope
for discretion and flexibility. According to the Protocol, the treatment of
foreign investment is going to be liberalised and cooperation targets in
science and technology have replaced objectives of domestic policy co-
ordination. The sectoral development programming now aims at raising
the efficiency of existing programmes (metal, chemical, petrochemical and
steel industries) instead of extending it to new sectors. The bold project
of a common automobile industry has been as abandoned as the objective
of a full-scale common external tariff. In total, the Andean Pact appro-
aches LAIA, still with more focus on industrial and agricultural coopera-
tion but at a much more modest profile.
4. The Central American Common Market
The Central American Common Market (CACM/MCCA) founded in
December 1960 by Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and later
on joined by Costa Rica (1962) belongs to those integration groupings
the trade effects of which have been extensively scrutinised by many
scholars. This interest can be explained by the relatively compact na-
1 E.g. Aitken, Lowry [1973]; Nugent [1974]; Segal [1967]; Wilford
[1970]; Willmore [ 1972; 1974; 1976; 1979]; Wionczek [ 1972].30
ture of the grouping comprising small countries, its straightforward
approach assisted by a relatively high degree of homogeneity and a large
amount of intraregional trade as well as by its performance during the
1961-1969 period. After this period interest came to a rapid standstill
due to the emerging disintegration tendencies.
Measured in terms of integration instruments applied, the CACM
followed the most far-reaching approach of all groupings. It aimed at
liberalising intraregional trade fully parallel to the introduction of a
common external tariff, envisaged the introduction of region-wide
monopolistic industries to be allocated equally among the five members
[Ramsett, 1969], implemented special promotion schemes for new import-
substituting industries, designed the harmonisation of fiscal incentives
for investment, launched a Central Bank for Economic Integration as a
multilateral financing facility, and finally, introduced clearing facilities
and institutions for compensation.
During the first decade success in trade liberalisation was doubt-
less by far larger than in regional industrial programming. With respect
to the latter, protocols specifying the status of regional industries for
tyres produced in Guatemala as well as for soda ash and insecticides
produced in Nicaragua were ratified and implemented but with large
delays. Ultimately, they were jeopardised by parallel investments in
other member countries (tyres in Costa Rica). Thus, trade integration
remained the nucleus of the CACM. By 1970, the stage of a customs
union was reached with very few exceptions. Intraregional trade shares
climbed from 6 per cent in 1960 for imports and 7 per cent for exports
to 24 and 27 per cent respectively, in 1970 [Heldt, 1974, Table 1]. Some
products which were traded more intensively within the region also suc-
ceeded to penetrate world markets, however, only until 1968. This pro-
vides some support for RIDC as a training ground for exporters (Table
Al).
Assessments on whether trade expansion within the CACM was of a
trade-creating or trade-diverting type did not arrive at conclusive re-
sults (Synoptical Table Al). However, when trade diversion occurred
there was no doubt who had to bear the costs. It was Honduras and to a
lesser extent Nicaragua while El Salvador and Guatemala were among
those who gained. Between 1960 and 1968 El Salvador, for instance, more
than quadrupled the share of manufactures in its annual exports to 2731
per cent, and almost all manufactures were exported to CACM countries
[SIECA, 1971].
Growing inequalities in bilateral trade balances were one reason for
the gradual decline of the CACM, but not the only one. By the end of
the 1960s all member countries incurred considerable losses in foreign
exchange because of falling world market prices for coffee, bananas and
cotton. In addition, the military conflict between Honduras and El Salva-
dor in mid-1969 did not only put a break on the bilateral relations but
also blocked intraregional transport and impeded trade flows heavily.
Since that time sporadic approaches to revitalise the CACM have been
undertaken but they were often impeded by either political conflicts
and/or external economic shocks such as the oil price hikes and the debt
problems. NTBs were introduced, exchange controls tightened, and
clearing and payments mechanisms blocked. Over more than a decade,
the CACM remained dormant and it was not until the mid-1980s that the
existing institutional framework was used again in order to speak with
one voice in external economic relations (an economic cooperation agree-
ment with the EC was launched in 1987) and to put a new common ex-
ternal tariff into place. This tariff, however, is only part of total NTBs
and tariff barriers (TBs) albeit one part which has become more impor-
tant in recent years as the majority of CACM members devaluated in real
terms and thus made tariffs effective again. The intraregional trade
share has approached the 20 per cent level (Table A3) but this overall
number hides much larger variances between the members than in the
past (Table 3). The trend towards bilateralism is visible within CACM,
too, and so is the new focus on cooperation in hardware (e.g. electricity
grid) and software (trade information system, business meetings). Opera-
tional solutions for unsettled clearing balances are discussed (e.g. cre-
ation of so-called Central American Import Rights as payments units in
intraregional trade) as long as the old clearing house arrangements
suspended in 1984 - are not yet in force.
To sum up major experiences gained from the CACM, the distri-
butional conflicts were eminent even within this rather small number of
relatively homogeneous countries. Regional import substitution prevailed
and though it may have had some reallocation effects among the member
countries, these effects must have remained small. The question whether
the CACM could have survived without the military conflicts is obsolete.32







































































































































Source: World Bank [1989a].
Doubtless, economic interdependences were too fragile even at the height
of the "good" years to make a politically-rooted interference costly in
economic terms. The fact that the CACM members never solved the issue
of free migration within the region supports the view that factor mobility
is an essential ingredient of growing economic interdependence.
5. The Caribbean Community
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was founded in 1973 as the
successor of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA). It com-
prises thirteen mostly island states (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St.
Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago). Four
members (Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago) are
institutionally acknowledged as the more advanced countries. Legally, the
member countries have agreed upon a common external tariff. About 90
per cent of total intraregional trade has been freed from restrictions,
but as CARICOM differentiates between more and less advanced member33
countries, only the former group has fully dismantled TBs against im-
ports from the latter ones. All members are oriented towards trade with
nonmember countries so that intraregional trade shares never exceeded
low levels of 6 per cent for imports (1985) and 6-8 per cent for exports
depending on commodity prices [ Andic et al. 1971; UNCTAD, b]. Food
products and other semi-processed goods dominate intraregional trade
though preference margins in consumer goods were sizeable given rela-
tively high tariff rates and an escalating tariff structure. For instance,
effective rates of protection in the manufacturing sector of Jamaica in
1978 were estimated as 68 per cent for import-substituting sectors, 19
per cent for exports to CARICOM countries and -10 per cent for exports
to the rest of the world [Foders, 1987, p. 78].
Basically, CARICOM is a customs union aiming at a common market
which is institutionally designed in an appendix to the CARICOM Treaty.
Rights of establishment, free trade in services and an industrial pro-
gramming scheme are envisaged as steps towards a common market, but
as many other instruments they have not yet been fully implemented.
Rules of origin and the exploitation of marine resources are contro-
versial issues not yet settled. The Caribbean Multilateral Clearing
Facility reached its credit ceilings and ceased operations in 1984. A
Caribbean Export Bank was launched in support of intraregional trade in
nontraditional manufactured goods but it is not likely to offset trends to
focus on trade with extraregional partners. The US, for instance, the
most important trading partner of the CARICOM countries started the
Caribbean Basin Initiative - among other things - in order to promote
manufactured exports of CARICOM countries to the US. After two de-
cades of experiences with integration, the CARICOM countries seem to be
a prototype for regional cooperation, e.g. in common infrastructure pro-
jects and coordination of exploitation of natural resources, rather than a
promising candidate for trade integration.34
III. Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Current Conditions for Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa provides the richest source of experiences with
integration and cooperation schemes in the developing world. These
experiences are full of dichotomies and ambivalence. There is obviously
no African politician who has not taken a positive stance towards inte-
gration and cooperation starting from modest neighbourhood relations and
ending with the all-embracing Lagos Plan of Action launched by the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in April 1980 envisaging free trade
among all African countries by the year 2000. But at the same time, the
continent hosts the largest number of ineffective, failed or dormant
groupings consisting of a secretariat and some adopted but not implement-
ed plans. Both history and current state of the groupings mirror the
extraordinary vulnerability and fragility of basic economic conditions in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1981 and 1986 intraregional trade in major
African integration schemes declined both in current US dollar and as
shares of total trade (Table A3).
Historically, there are three roots of integration. Firstly, those
groupings which gained importance beyond narrow sub-regional circles
are remnants of large colonial entities. For instance, in francophone
Africa the two Federations of French West and Equatorial Africa were the
predecessors of two customs unions. One was the Customs Union of West
African States (CUWAS) which in 1973 became the WAEC when the former
UN trusteeship territory Togo was admitted as a member. The other one
was the Equatorial Customs Union (ECU) which together with Cameroon
became the CACEU in 1964. Similarly, in anglophone East Africa the
basis for integrating Kenya and Uganda with the mandated territory
Tanganyika to a customs union was achieved in the colonial period, and
the ill-fated East African Community (EAC), founded in 1967, basically
strove for sustaining this level of integration while achieving an "equal"
distribution of net benefits.
Secondly, new groupings were founded after gaining independence
which either bridged the borderline between adjacent countries belonging
to different colonial powers in the past but sharing some common ele-35
ments such as the language (e.g. the Communities of the Great Lakes
and of Central African States bringing the former Belgian colonies in
contact with the French-originating countries). Alternatively, in West
Africa the foundation of the ECOWAS in 1975 paid tribute to the fact
that the anglophone "islands" (Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the
politically powerful Nigeria) and the lusophone Guinea-Bissau maintained
strong traditional commercial links with their francophone neighbours.
This happened either through border trade or through large-scale smug-
gling with the francophone countries; through currency substitution with
stable currencies like the Franc of the Communaute Financiere Africaine
(CFA) replacing the anglophone currencies; or through intensive labour
migration.
Thirdly, new integration initiatives emerged in Southern Africa from
the political conflict with South Africa and aimed at loosening the com-
mercial ties to South Africa.
Economically, the current malaise of Sub-Saharan Africa has put
integration efforts under considerable pressure because imports of goods
and labour from member countries became restricted as a seemingly easy
way to cope with balance of payments problems and unemployment. Yet,
regardless of this malaise, there was one basic dichotomy integration and
cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa has faced from the time when the
countries became independent. That is the trade-off between the eco-
nomic desirability of overcoming "balcanisation" and the political costs in
terms of power erosion to the detriment of leaders in backward member
countries. All leaders actively interfere into the economy of their coun-
tries and worry about their tax and rent base which is assumed to
shrink in the integration process. In this respect, the claim for "equal
distribution of benefits" basically appears to be a catchword for rent-
conservation in backward member countries.
Given the myriad of integration efforts including project-linked
cooperation (e.g. river basin organisations, regional organisations in-
tended to fight pests and droughts), the following outline of major
schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa can by no means be exhaustive. It aims
at discussing the economic effects of integration tools implemented. Re-
cent problems and decisions taken at summit meetings in the major
groupings are summarised in Synoptical Table A2.36
2. The West African Economic Community
The West African Economic Community (WAEC/CEAO) comprising
Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Senegal (Benin
and Togo have a permanent observer status) was founded in 1974 to
cope with the shortcomings of its predecessor, the CUWAS. Such short-
comings were mainly identified as lacking compensation for trade
diversion-induced losses in budget revenues [ Robson, 1983, Chapter 4].
They emerged as a nonnegligible problem because of four peculiarities
of the WAEC which in principle are conducive to intensive intraregional
trade.
Firstly, the WAEC members are complementary in their production
structures. Intersectoral division of labour is important in trade between
Mali and Burkina Faso on the one hand as potential exporters of agricul-
tural products, and Senegal and Ivory Coast on the other hand as rela-
tively industrialised countries. The share of intraregional trade in total
trade of the grouping amounted to 7 per cent in 1985 which is above the
level achieved by other Sub-Saharan African groupings, e.g. the similar
one in Central Africa [ UNCTAD, a]. More illustrative than this overall
figure is the fact that in 1981 as well as 1985 about 37-38 per cent of
Ivorian manufactured exports and about 10 per cent of its total exports
were directed to WAEC countries with some manufactured goods such as
cement, fertilisers, household equipment and trailers exceeding the 70
per cent level (Table 4). However, only very few manufactured imports
of the Ivory Coast originated from member countries. Such a regional
distribution of intraregional trade suggests two things: a keen interest
of the Ivorian industry in the regional market facilitating perhaps com-
pensation schemes, and a concern of backward members' industries to be
outcompeted by suppliers from Senegal and Ivory Coast. In fact, indus-
tries like footwear and textiles ranked highly as sensitive industries in
intraregional trade liberalisation as they are produced in almost all
member states.
Secondly, natural barriers to trade like prohibitive transportation
costs are lower than elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. Railway links
exist between Senegal and Mali as well as between Ivory Coast and Bur-
kina Faso. Policy-induced barriers to trade hence gain more attention in
decision making of politicians in the less advanced member states who37
Table 4 - Share of Intra-WAEC Imports and Exports of the Ivory Coast







Rubber tyres, tubes 625
Paper, precut 642
Cotton fabrics 652
Woven man-made fibre fabrics 653
Textile fabrics, n.e.s. 658




















Woven man-made fibre fabrics 653
Cement 661.2











































































































Source: UN [ 1982; 1987]; own calculations.38
mostly have vested interests in protecting domestic industrialisation, no
matter how inefficient these industries are.
Thirdly, the WAEC enjoys a high degree of factor mobility. The
monetary union with a common central bank allows for free mobility of
capital, and labour mobility is high as well. Though in the past initi-
atives to grant citizenship failed in the Ivory Coast there is a large
amount of migration between landlocked and coastal member states. The
effects of factor mobility on trade are ambivalent. The existence of the
monetary union denies autonomous exchange rate changes (depreciation)
to landlocked countries as a device to improve their competitive position
vis-a-vis the more advanced coastal countries. Fiscal and wage policies
are likely to be overburdened to substitute for lacking exchange rate
adjustment within the union. Furthermore, theoretically labour mobility
leading to migration from landlocked to coastal countries may have a
wage-dumping effect in the coastal countries and impede the competitive-
ness of labour-intensive products in labour-abundant backward member
states. Yet, on the other hand, factor mobility in general will tend to
lower costs of information and transaction in intraregional trade and thus
stimulate trade. In addition, what seems more relevant in a situation of
un- and underemployment and a low marginal labour productivity in the
backward countries is the income-generating effect of labour migration.
Workers from backward areas earn their income in the coastal areas,
remit their incomes to their home countries under conditions of full
capital mobility and thus contribute to sustained import demand. The
latter effect is expected to prevail in the WAEC.
Fourthly, compensation elements outside the framework of the WAEC
were available through the so-called "Council of the Entente" financing
development projects preferably in the backward states and funded -
apart from external funds - more by Ivory Coast and Senegal than by
the recipient countries.
In spite of such favourable preconditions an efficient intraregional
division of labour did not materialise in the WAEC for several reasons.
One package of problems comprises external shocks, overall economic
policy failures in leading countries (e. g. public overspending in the
Ivory Coast following the commodity price boom in the late 1970s), and
corruption in the WAEC Secretariat. Apart from that, an essential mis-
take was the melange of allocation and distribution policies in the main39
instrument of the WAEC, the so-called Taxe de Cooperation Regionale
(TCR). Like its model, the single tax (taxe unique) in the CACEU, the
TCR is a substitute for customs duties on industrial imports from third
countries and is levied on imports from member countries. It accrues to
the consuming country, differs by enterprise, product and country and
aims at establishing an automatic link with fiscal compensation for reve-
nue losses due to trade diversion. Differences between hypothetical
customs revenues gained from third country imports and TCR revenues
are compensated through interbudgetary transfers effected through a
Community Development Fund. Compensation is provided to the extent of
two-thirds of assessed losses, due to trade diversion. Fund revenues are
paid by the member states according to their share in intraregional trade
in TCR eligible products. The remaining one third is covered by discre-
tionary contributions of the more advanced member states.
This complex system clearly aimed at limiting intraregional compe-
tition through tax differentiation between lower rates for backward coun-
tries' products and higher rates for advanced countries' products. It
raised effective rates of protection through tax escalation and promoted
regional import substitution through explicit discrimination against third
country sources. Costs have been borne both by the backward countries
keeping inefficient industries alive and by the more advanced member
states protecting them against outside competition to the detriment of
their international competitiveness.
It adds to the difficulties encountered by the WAEC that no ex-
ternal tariff could be established beyond an insignificant common duty in
a two-tier tariff in which the much more important fiscal duties differ
among the member states. Unilateral measures applied by backward mem-
bers against imports from Senegal and Ivory Coast in recent years led to
a further deviation from the customs union target (Synoptical Table A2).
The willingness to compensate backward members for customs revenues
foregone has declined since the Ivory Coast experienced an economic
crisis.
What keeps the WAEC alive is the existence of the monetary union,
the perception of having vested interests in forming a coalition against
the political and economic potential of Nigeria within ECOWAS, and -
most importantly - the access to external funds designed for cooperation
projects such as a solar energy project.40
3. The Economic Community of West African States
The Economic Community of West African Stated (ECOWAS/CEDEAO)
founded in 1975 by all sixteen francophone, anglophone and lusophone
West African states covering an area from Mauritania to Nigeria has
received the largest attention of scholars interested in Sub-Saharan
African integration. Such attention can be explained by the sheer size
of the Community (about 180 mill, inhabitants), by the ambitious cha-
racter of bridging cultural, ethnical and language diversities and by the
seeming attractiveness of studying pan-African integration en miniature.
However, this interest devoted to ECOWAS clearly contrasts with
the achievements of this grouping. Though more than 90 per cent of
total trade of ECOWAS members with African countries is within ECOWAS
[World Bank, 1988], intraregional trade accounted but for 3.2 per cent
of world exports of ECOWAS in 1986 (Table A3). Most intraregional trade
is in primary commodities and would have also occurred without integra-
tion. Yet, recorded trade is only part of total trade since deficient trade
statistics, smuggling and traditional border trade are wide-spread phe-
nomena in ECOWAS [ Igue, 1976, 1983; Akano, 1984; Deardorff, Stolper,
1990]. They reflect the magnitudes of differences in national sectoral
policy interference and the low degree of macroeconomic policy coordina-
tion.
A number of ECOWAS members are marginal and counterproductive
ones in the sense that they do not participate actively in the integration
process but prevent the Community from implementing adopted decisions
unanimously. By behaving in this way, they add a cost element to deci-
sion making. The discrepancy between Nigeria and the remaining fifteen
members in terms of market size, production and trade is without any
parallel in other integration groupings throughout the world. Nigeria
offers an enormous potential of new export markets for the smaller coun-
tries provided they meet origin rules and competitive requirements.
However, reluctance to open own markets to Nigerian products dominates
over own export interests.
1 E.g. Akinyemi et al. [1984]; Asante [1985; 1986]; Orimalade, Ubogu
[1984]; Robson [1983].41
Given such constraints multiplied by severe bottlenecks to trade in
the infrastructure, ECOWAS has appeared as a poor candidate for trade
integration from its very beginning but as a promising one for coopera-
tion bringing some neighbouring countries together under an ECOWAS-
wide institutional framework [Zehender, 1987, Chapter 3].
This judgment has proven to be correct. None of the liberalisation
schedules were kept which were laid out in the Treaty as three stages
towards the formation of a customs union to be terminated within fifteen
years. Apart from political problems manifested in border conflicts or
problems of economic decay following the decline in commodity prices, the
difficulties of compromising on common trade preferences were underrat-
ed. Nomenclatures, tax levels and structures, valuation bases, origin
rules and other important ingredients of border control differed widely
and so did perceptions of minimum local equity shares in enterprises
producing goods under Community treatment. Again, different percep-
tions emerged between francophone countries with relatively low local
ownership in multinational corporations on the one hand and anglophone
countries on the other hand where local ownership shares were more
sizeable [Robson, 1983, p. 117-18].
Overall, ECOWAS was best characterised by the former Nigerian
president Shagari who, in 1980, stated that protocols and decisions were
not being ratified as fast as could reasonably be expected. Even those
ratified were hardly implemented to spirit and letter [ Africa Research
Bulletin, 1980, No. 5, p. 6440].
This assessment has not lost its validity in a worsening economic
environment in the 1980s. Some institutional achievements, such as the
foundation of a West African Clearing House (operating on a very modest
scale with declining transactions in recent years; Table A2) or coopera-
tion in shipping, have failed to offset the setbacks [Robson, 1985, p.
619]. Among them, the most critical one was the expulsion of ECOWAS
residents from Nigeria in 1985 which violated the immigration protocol
adopted by ECOWAS members. Given such setbacks, ECOWAS activities
recently turned towards new areas of economic cooperation, e.g. to the
externally cosponsored regional telecommunication network, a customs
computerisation programme pursued with assistance of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations42
Development Programme (UNDP) and bilateral donors, and an ECOWAS
cultural framework.
Furthermore, ECOWAS agreed to increase the callable capital of the
ECOWAS Fund from US $ 90 mill, to US $ 360 mill, in order to enlarge
its guarantee capacity and thereby to improve its fund-raising position.
A so-called ECO-Bank, a cooperative project for the private sector en-
terprises started its operations primarily focusing on offshore banking
[UNCTAD, b].
In spite of discouraging experiences with regional industrial pro-
gramming, ECOWAS adopted an Industrial Development Programme in 1986
for the period 1987-1991 setting out essentially a programme of action to
prepare a Multisectoral Master Plan.
To summarise, contrasting to its ambitious Treaty, ECOWAS has re-
mained a dormant integration scheme which only recently seems to have
taken into account the very high barriers to efficient regional integra-
tion. As trade effects are assessed to be low if not marginal, one cannot
deny that ECOWAS instruments have not yet had discriminatory conse-
quences for extra- and intraregional trade flows worth to be mentioned.
4. The Central African Customs and Economic Union
Until the mid-1970s the Central African Customs and Economic Union
(CACEU/UDEAC) founded in 1964 and comprising Cameroon, Gabon, the
Central African Republic (CAR), Congo, Chad, and later on Equatorial
Guinea, was evaluated as a promising integration bloc which closely ap-
proached the stage of a customs union. The reasons for this assessment
resemble those given for the WAEC: there were the colonially based
patterns of close monetary cooperation (though the Central Bank of Cen-
tral African States and the agreements with France did not arrive at a
monetary union in a strict sense), a common external tariff negotiated in
the 1960s between the member countries of the old ECU and the new
member Cameroon, and - most importantly - the so-called single tax
system as a substitute to internal customs duties similar to the TCR in
the WAEC. Furthermore, the member countries negotiated a common in-
vestment code for industries of regional importance, participated in a
common oil refinery for some time, and maintained a common river ship-43
ping agency also for some time.
Yet, expectations did not materialise. Firstly, the single tax differ-
ing by origin and consumer countries for the same products as well as
by enterprises had the same effect as the TCR. It promoted regional
import substitution and sheltered marginal suppliers against competition
from member countries. In addition, it raised the effective rate of pro-
tection of finished goods as inputs were imported duty-free, and imposed
high costs of administration and enforcement of rules as tax evasion was
to be avoided [ Ekwe, 1987]. Ravenhill's judgement [1985, p. 208] that
the single tax system acted perversely to protect inefficient domestic
industries and to encourage intraregional import substitution, is well-
taken. Secondly, common projects such as the oil refinery and the
shipping agency were given up. Thirdly, the former two-tier common
external tariff with customs duties and fiscal duties became diluted by
so-called supplementary taxes which differed by CACEU countries.
Fourthly, no agreement could be reached with respect to labour mobility
within the Union. Fifthly, common industrialisation planning on a regional
scale failed for which the common investment code should pave the way.
Sixthly, compensation instruments such as the Solidarity Fund imple-
mented in the 1960s and early 1970s were abolished. Seventhly, invest-
ment in infrastructure such as the two new railway trunks (Transcam-
erounais and Transgabonais) remained national projects and failed to
overcome the high natural protection rates which emerged because of
inadequate conditions for surface transport. Eighthly, monetary cooper-
ation and coordination could not be sustained on the high level achieved
in francophone West Africa.
Parallel to these setbacks, the share of intraregional trade in total
trade fell from 4 per cent in the first part of the 1970s to 2.8 per cent
in 1986 (Table A3). New initiatives towards integration could not be
launched in the past. This is indicated by the meagre results of summit
meetings between 1985 and 1988 (Table A2). A basic revision of all inte-
gration instruments is under way and cooperation projects in software
development (technology, agriculture, livestock, transport) have gained
more attractiveness than in the past. Obviously, the CACEU is in a
1 Langdon, Mytelka [1979]; Langhammer [1978]; Mytelka [1973];
Ndongko [1985]; Robson [1968]; Yondo [1970].44
stalemate position as larger groupings in Central Africa which include
Zaire seem to have more appeal (without coming to more concrete results,
however). Expanding the country coverage of Central African groupings
will have the effect of further lessening the trend towards a customs
union while bilateral cooperation, e.g. between Zaire and Congo or
between Cameroon, Gabon and the CAR, will be promoted.
From its very beginning the three crucial constraints of the CACEU
were the outward orientation of the two primary commodity exporting
countries Gabon and Congo, the - even by African standards - extra-
ordinary economic weakness of the two backward members CAR and
Chad, and high natural protection through an inadequate transportation
network. Affiliates of multinational enterprises produce homogeneous
goods in several member countries (e.g. footwear and clothing), and
they are sheltered against competition among each other through both
natural and policy-induced barriers. In those manufactured products
where intraregional trade exists, market size in the backward countries
is so small that "training ground" arguments, economies of scale or other
dynamic effects have no meaning at all. In each CACEU member country
it is solely the domestic market which matters for local producers.
5. The East African Community
The experiences of the East African Community (EAC) comprising
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda provide the deepest insights into the rise
and decay of a grouping covering the whole spectrum of far-reaching
trade integration cum compensation and common infrastructure policies.
During the colonial period mainland Tanzania (the former Tanganyika)
had achieved a common internal market together with the two other coun-
tries. The Community included a common customs tariff, tax harmoni-
sation, a monetary union, and common services (railway, ports, com-
munication, universities, and other research institutes). Under such
conditions but not necessarily because of them, Kenya developed to an
industrial centre in the region. Over time the Kenyan manufacturing
Kenya enjoyed a better colonial status than the other member coun-
tries. As a crown colony more resources were flowing into the coun-45
sector found important market outlets in the two neighbouring countries
thus supporting an intersectoral division of labour between the major
exporter of manufactures and the two other member states exporting
commodities and food products. The transition from colonial rule to inde-
pendence paved the way towards disintegration in the 1960s when not
only politicians but also scholars highlighted the question of net gainers
from integration under zero-sum game assumptions. Empirical analyses
saying that Tanzania was a net loser due to integration were heavily
disputed in academic circles but provided legitimacy for the two net
importers Tanzania and Uganda to urge for compensation and finally to
initiate the dissolution of the Community.
In the mid-1960s - still under the old rules of the pre-independence
customs union - Kenya agreed to a number of measures restricting its
intraregional exports and promoting its imports but this only led to
stronger competition on the Kenyan domestic market and did not sizeably
promote imports from Tanzania and Uganda. Financial compensation given
in the so-called "Distributable Pool" also failed to contain the decay. So
did a sharp intervention into intraregional trade through the introduction
of border taxes (so-called transfer taxes) in 1967, when the Community
was officially inaugurated. External shocks such as the oil price hike
severely reduced the willingness of partners to secure financing of com-
mon services and coincided with growing internal disputes on economic
order principles between socialist Tanzania and capitalist Kenya. Finally,
the Amin rule and the "looking South to Zambia perception" of Tanzania
contributed to the collapse of the Community which took a number of
years until it was disbanded 1977, ten years after its foundation.
Lessons taught by the experiences of the EAC are fivefold. Firstly,
disputes on the basics of macroeconomic management are deadly for a
Community. When Tanzania firmly took its stance towards state planning
against the relatively market-oriented system of Kenya, no compensation
scheme was able to bridge the dissent.
tries, and an administrative network was established by the metro-
politan power. It is subject to debate to what extent the superior
development of Kenya was based on this advantage.
Cf. Hazlewood [ 1975; 1979] summarising the work mainly done under
his initiative at the Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics.46
Secondly, free circulation of labour can be an essential amalgam of
regional integration. It was one of the very few prerequisites missing in
the pre-Community stage of integration under colonial rule.
Thirdly, the dissolution of a monetary union as it happened in East
Africa after 1961 provided scope for autonomous exchange-rate changes
but failed to be effective when massive interventions into intraregional
trade occured simultaneously.
Fourthly, the "training ground" argument of regional integration
must be questioned again. Kenya never achieved international competi-
tiveness of manufactured goods exported intraregionally.
Fifthly, common services in "hardware" (physical infrastructure)
are vulnerable if the institutional management lies in the hands of the
participating partners which take dissenting views about burden sharing.
Probably, the distribution of benefits was conditioned by the level of
economic development: Kenya as the more advanced partner could draw
more benefits from common services than Tanzania and Uganda
[Hazlewood, 1979]. Decentralisation of headquarters failed to offset this
fundamental relation between economic development and transactions in
services. Perhaps, the internationalisation of common services beyond the
participating states could have saved them from decay.
6. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference
The Southern African Development Coordination Conference
(SADCC) founded in 1980 by the five so-called frontline states Angola,
Botswana, Mocambique, Zambia, and Tanzania and later on joined by
Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe pursues a basically political
objective, to coordinate measures aimed at reducing economic dependency
on South Africa. This approach is mainly geared at capital-intensive
regional cooperation in "hardware" (e.g. establishing an own transport
network to become independent from South African railways). Given this
objective, SADCC has to rely on external funds available to support a
genuine political rather than an economic target. All this and the explicit
renunciation of trade integration has made SADCC unique among African
regional groupings. In fact, trade integration in this region is covered47
by the "sister" organisation PTA which widely overlaps with SADCC in
membership.
The record of summit meetings of SADCC during the period 1985-
1988 (Synoptical Table A2) suggests that the political objective has not
yet been fully shared by all members to the same extent. Countries
maintaining strong economic relations with South Africa in trade, capital
transactions and labour migration like Malawi and Lesotho abstained from
summit meetings. Furthermore, even without these two members, sanc-
tions against South Africa as the main political point on the summit
agenda could not be agreed upon unanimously.
Economically, the SADCC has been successful in 1988 to commit
external donors to financing regional projects in the transport and com-
munication sector. This may cement regional cooperation between SADCC
members at least until 1991. However, such external pump-priming can-
not obscure the fact that internal cooperation is still very fragile. Re-
cent experiences with the SADCC Food Security Program as one of the
most important projects aiming at market stabilisation, regional trade and
food aid do not seem to be encouraging. Hay and Rukuni [ 1988] conclude
that it has been easier to define the benefits of regional collaboration
than to capture them. Its success is said to rest to a more critical ex-
tent on the level of confidence existing among member states than on the
technical and financial capacity to pursue its objectives. The coherence
of the SADCC grouping is assumed to be still too fragile to permit rapid
progress as policies are strongly identified with ideologies which are
very different among the members. Slow progress in the programme is
linked to the emerging danger that the programme is seen by member
states as an additional means by which they can gain access to invest-
ment funds for their own national development. As a result of this pri-
ority for national development, there are incentives to identify regional
benefits for what are essentially national plans so that they qualify for
regional support [ibid., p. 1021].
Additionally, the existence of a well-performing member country in
the agricultural sector with good natural, physical and human resource
endowment, which is Zimbabwe among its malaise-ridden neighbours, has
For details on the early history of SADCC, cf. Zehender [1983].48
made cooperation more sensitive and touchy. And finally, reliance on
regional rather than national supply does not yet seem to be undisputed
as the proposal of Zimbabwe has witnessed to extend energy supply from
its Kariba South hydroelectric station despite the availability of surplus
electricity on the Zambian side of the scheme.
To summarise, SADCC in its present form seems still far from being
a grouping with clearly defined objectives, efficient instruments on a re-
gional scale and a good implementation record. While external shocks and
internal noneconomic problems like famines, droughts, disruptive civil
conflicts and the confrontation with South Africa cannot be denied to
have contributed to the disappointing results, the deep-rooted ideological
differences between the members should not be underrated. They require
a broadening (and growing vagueness) of objectives defined and compro-
mising on instruments applied as the Food Security Program has demon-
strated. More conflicts as those having emerged until now could be con-
tained by easy access to external public funds which enable "shopping
lists" to be implemented. Should access to external funds become inelas-
tic, however, SADCC will be exposed to stronger internal pressures.
Then, it will have to pass the test whether regional cooperation can be
initiated with own funds and beyond purely political targets.
7. The Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern African States
The Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern African States
(PTA) which was constituted in 1981 can be understood as the regional
trade department of SADCC whose member states form the nucleus of
PTA. Additionally, seven countries (Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Mauritius, Rwanda, and Somalia) acceded the PTA while Angola was the
only SADCC member which abstained from PTA membership until late
1989.
Though the PTA comprises members of failed or still existing insti-
tutions such as the EAC or the Community of the Great Lakes or the old
South African Customs Union (SACU), this grouping does not and cannot
Cf. consultative meeting of January 1988 in Arusha (Synoptical Table
A2).49
claim to act as a successor of any of these institutions. Given the extra-
ordinary heterogeneity of the grouping ranging from remote island states
like Comoros to core countries like Zambia, Kenya and Zimbabwe, the
multilateral approach to trade integration was not feasible from the very
beginning. Instead, trade concessions with most-favoured nation treat-
ment within the region were introduced, which were designed in a way
that only very few countries were able to benefit from these concessions.
As a result, no more than 50 per cent of Heads of States participated in
each of the annual summit meetings between 1985 and 1988 (Synoptical
Table A2). Under such circumstances the adoption of programmes has no
meaning as missing member states do not adhere to them.
In every aspect, the record of the PTA reflects a typical sequence
of all African groupings regardless whether they aim at cooperation or
integration: a dynamic initial phase of launching various programmes and
institutions (such as a common list for products to be liberalised, a PTA
Clearing House and a PTA Development Bank) is followed by a phase of
implementation and ratification problems or even nonimplementation.
In the PTA, the implementation of the trade-liberalisation programme
was seriously delayed by dissenting views on the provisions limiting
preferences to companies with majority equity holdings of nationals of
member states. The 1986 summit approved a sophisticated three-tier
system with preference margins increasing with local ownership which
widened the scope for red tape.
Another shortcoming of the PTA has been the failure to dismantle
administrative barriers in the clearance of transit transport. Govern-
mental decisions to accept a single Road Customs Transit Document in
the PTA and to introduce a so-called PTA Third Party Motor Vehicle
Liability Insurance Scheme for facilitating transit trade are simply not
passed down the ranks so that arbitrary decisions ultimately rest with
the customs posts.
Administration of import licencing arrangements is reported to be an
additional source of disputes in the PTA. Bilateral open general import
licence arrangements between PTA member countries had to be cancelled
because the PTA membership does not allow closed-ended bilateral ar-
rangements. This led to a decline of trade between members like Malawi
and Zimbabwe [World Bank, 1988c, p. 52]. Furthermore, "tied" credit
lines granted by foreign donors do not allow for a preferential use of50
import licencing to the advantage of PTA members. Foreign exchange
shortages have been assessed as a major reason of restrictive import
licencing. Clearing arrangements through the Harare-based PTA Clearing
House were intended to ease this problem for intra-PTA trade as the
provisions for these arrangements do not require full cash settlement.
However, the 1987 Summit stated as a main problem that the facilities
were still insufficiently used. Notwithstanding arrears in balance
settlement, the major problem still remains that import licences are dis-
cretionarily allocated in favour of so-called essential goods imported from
outside the PTA. PTA-originating goods, on the other hand, are fre-
quently regarded as nonessential goods that could be replaced by do-
mestic production. Irrespective of the allocation of import licences there
is a clear trade diversion bias in the selection of products eligible for
trade preferences as at least one member state must document its official
"import interest". It is very likely that such an interest will be denied if
local producers are exposed to competition from intraregional suppliers
and be announced only if extraregional imports can be replaced.
Shortcomings have not deterred the governments of PTA member
states to go ahead. Two major plans were launched recently. Firstly, a
schedule for intra-PTA liberalisation was approved at the 1987 Summit to
the effect that between 1988 and 1996 tariffs should be reduced by 10
per cent annually. Secondly, traveller cheques denominated in PTA Cur-
rency Units (PTACU) were introduced in 1988 compulsory for all
travellers within the region in order to facilitate commercial exchanges
and to set local businessmen free from current exchange restrictions.
Both clearing arrangements and the removal of payments restrictions are
based on external policy advice granted to PTA members [ Anjaria et al. ,
1982]. Again, the basic problem rests with implementation apart from
well-founded doubts whether such institutional arrangements really cure
the crucial barriers to trade within the PTA, that is a vast amount of
NTBs often arbitrarily applied.
Prospects for the PTA mainly arise from existing trade relations
between neighbouring countries such as Malawi, Zimbabwe, Botswana,
and Zambia. Major trade creating effects, however, are very unlikely to
occur if the distinction between "essential" goods from non-PTA sources
and "nonessential" goods from PTA sources remains effective. Given the
current economic crisis in almost all member states, the existence of the51
PTA is critically linked to access to foreign funds and expertise on all
aspects of customs clearance, invoicing and transit trade.
IV. Regional Integration in the Middle East and Asia
1. The Basics of Regional Integration in the Middle East and Asia
Regional integration as well as cooperation schemes in the Middle
East and Asia have never gained such attractiveness compared to Latin
America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Political as well as economic factors
bear responsibility for this fact. Politically, countries in the two regions
often confronted themselves in a state of hostility where the political
rationale of defining common targets became overshadowed by blunt na-
tionalism. In those instances where common external challenges gave
scope for some initiatives as in North Africa and the Middle East, they
soon proved to be either pure rhetorics or ill-conceived blueprints with-
out any substance.
Economically, the enormous heterogeneity of countries raised con-
cern of unequal distribution of benefits. The region hosts huge entities
at different levels of industrialisation and income like Indonesia, India
and China, prosperous outward-oriented city states like Hong Kong and
Singapore, resource-rich economies exporting the same products like the
oil-exporting countries, dynamic resource-poor achievers like Taiwan and
South Korea, least developed countries like Nepal and Bangladesh as well
as middle-income countries which try to manage the take-off from com-
modity exporters to efficient producers of manufactures.
Except for the traditional division of labour between primary com-
modity exporters and exporters of manufactures which does not require
integration schemes, the degree of complementarity among Asian and
Middle Eastern countries has been low. The same applies to infrastruc-
ture networks. All countries were individual achievers in exchange with
industrialised economies rather than team achievers. In most cases, this
option did not prove to be unsuccessful so that the integration argument
was beaten by the evidence of individual performance. Ambitious plans
like the design of an Arab Common Market or a Maghreb Customs Union
thus remained paper work. Even modest integration approaches like52
preferential tariff reductions on an item-by-item basis like the Bangkok
Agreement between Bangladesh, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic,
South Korea, and Sri Lanka failed to produce results worth mentioning.
Instead of integration, cooperation has recently found more interest
in the two regions as it is witnessed by the emergence of the Gulf Co-
operation Council (GCC) with Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates as well as of the South Asian
Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) set up between Bangla-
desh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka in
1981. Both schemes still provide little more than an institutional umbrella
and thus will not be analysed in the following. Yet, they underline that
interests are strongly in favour of economic cooperation and not of inte-
gration. Therefore, in the following only two schemes are shortly intro-
duced which pursued very different approaches of either private goods-
based intraregional cooperation (Regional Co-operation for Development)
or public goods-based extraregional cooperation (ASEAN).
2. The Regional Co-operation for Development
From its beginning in 1964, the Regional Co-operation for Develop-
ment (RCD) between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan renounced to formulate
ambitious liberalisation schedules. Instead, RCD confined itself to pro-
mote trade among the partner countries pragmatically, i. e. on a bilateral
level and in sectors where common interests could be defined. In addi-
tion, the grouping aimed at cooperating in transport and communication,
and it is in these sectors where it could achieve notable results during
the period 1964-1976. The wide interest which the RCD gained during
this period, however, can be derived from another instrument which
scholars like Little [ 1966] and Brewster [ 1971] had recommended as a
second-best model if full .integration of a region in the shape of a com-
mon market could not be achieved. So-called joint purpose enterprises
(JPEs) in which private agents and/or statals or parastatals would
Cf. the very detailed description of Bahadir [1984, pp. 300-339] and
the periodical publication of annual RDC reports and newsletters cited
in Bahadir.53
finance part of the equity capital were thought to help creating an ele-
ment of regional interest and solidarity [Little, 1966, p. 181]. The RCD
implemented some JPEs which were characterised by relatively strong
public interference, e.g. public ownership, long-term purchase or sourc-
ing guarantees given by nonproducing member states, and guarantees
referring to profit participation and repatriation in currencies in which
the equity payment was made. Purchase or sourcing guarantees acted as
substitutes for preferential tariff treatment and thus stimulated more
trade diversion than would have been possible under conditions of pre-
ference margins only.
Until the early 1970s, the RCD implemented three enterprises with
joint equity participation of at least two member states: an enterprise
producing bank notes and security paper in Karachi, an aluminium com-
pany producing aluminium bars in Tehran on the basis of commodities
imported from RCD member states, and a ball bearing industry in
Karachi. During the 1970s, eight other JPEs began to operate, however,
only under national ownership and with long-term purchase guarantees.
By 1980, another nine industries were in the stage of planning.
After the Iranian revolution in 1979 the RCD came to a standstill;
even a formal dissolution was discussed but not implemented. Initiatives
to reactivate the RCD came from Iran in 1984. Under a new heading
called Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO), new fields of common
interest in hardware and software cooperation have been explored, but
hitherto with little result given the extraordinary internal and external
constraints the region has to cope with.
With these sudden breaks in the history of the RCD, an assessment
of experiences is practically impossible. Intraregional trade volumes are
no adequate yardsticks as trade integration was not aimed at. Intra-
regional trade shares never exceeded 1 or 2 per cent during the RCD
period, and the sudden jump to 10 per cent after 1984 in the ECO period
(Table A3) has nothing to do with integration but simply reflects the
dramatic decline of the Iranian trade volume during the Gulf war and the
continuation of bilateral commodity trade between Turkey and Iran.
More telling is the fact that plans to merge the three national air-
lines or to link the three capitals by means of a railway trunk never
approached the stage of implementation. The JPEs were a very first
approach of sectoral industrialisation planning on a regional level. This54
approach was bound to end in an impasse given the diverging interests
of producing and non-producing countries and the shortcomings of plan-
ning on a national level in the three countries. What emerged as the out-
come of planning "from the top" is that the JPE strategy failed to attract
private capital owners, as it was the initial target of the RCD Chamber
of Commerce and Industry founded as an intermediary between private
sectors in the member states. Full reliance on public ownership, how-
ever, meant subordination of production of private goods under political
objectives which changed rapidly when the leading force in the RCD, the
Iran, entered a period of revolution followed by the Gulf war.
3. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) founded by
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in 1967 and
joined by Brunei in 1984 is by far the most successful Asian integration
and cooperation scheme. This success can be measured in terms of
worldwide reputation and acceptance of ASEAN by OECD members as a
permanent dialogue partner.
At first glance it is amazing that ASEAN owes this standing neither
to the formation of a uniform trading bloc with supranational sovereignty
in trade policies nor to the advancement of regional industrialisation
schemes with JEPs as in the RCD case. In both aspects, ASEAN has
failed to meet expectations.
With respect to trade, the member countries initially agreed on a
Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) and recently - on the occasion
of the third ASEAN Summit in December 1987 - scheduled an
improvement of the PTA in terms of product coverage and depth of tariff
cuts. However, tariff preferences do not play a significant role in intra-
ASEAN trade, and it is very unlikely that this will change in the future.
This assessment is first witnessed by the fact that no regular statistical
record on the amount of intra-ASEAN trade receiving preferences exists.
An approximate information referring to intraregional exports supported
For comprehensive overviews on ASEAN achievements, cf. ASEAN
[1987a; 1987b] and Sopiee et al. [1987].55
by rules-of-origin certificates suggests that this trade had amounted to
only US $ 45 mill, in 1982 [quoted in Chng, 1985, p. 33], that is 1 per
cent of total intra-ASEAN non-oil exports. The overwhelming part of
intra-ASEAN trade (Table A4) occurs either in primary commodities not
eligible for preferential treatment, or in entrepot trade, or in manufac-
tures which do not meet rules of origin requirements [ Rieger, 1985].
Rules of origins are important in a PTA where tariff protection levels
differ widely among the partner countries, not only in the special case
of Singapore as an almost free trade area but also between Indonesia and
Malaysia. Such rules restrictively applied have enabled the ASEAN coun-
tries to improve the PTA "at the surface" without exposing domestic
industries to intensified regional competition as most of the eligible
products do not meet the rules. Thus, in spite of extended product
coverage and larger preference margins the PTA will remain widely inef-
fective unless rules of origin are not substantially liberalised. However,
even if this should occur it will remain doubtful whether TBs are really
an important impediment to intra-ASEAN trade. Recent empirical evidence
has supported the view that there is much water in legal tariff rates
[Langhammer, 1988] and that NTBs are looked upon as the more relevant
obstacles to trade by ASEAN traders [Sanchez, 1987].
As far. as the second major field of action within ASEAN is con-
cerned, i. e. economic cooperation, a distinction has to be made between
internal industrial cooperation and external cooperation in areas of
common interest. Internal industrial cooperation became mainly influenced
by the recommendations of a UN mission in the early 1970s [UN, 1974] in
favour of large-scale regional industrial projects. Subsequently, three
basic instruments were developed, each one designed as a substitute of a
former approach which failed. The first instrument was framed as so-
called ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIPs), i.e. five large scale industrial
plants to be located in each of the five founding member states (two
urea projects in Indonesia and Malaysia, a diesel engine plant in Singa-
pore, a super phosphate plant in the Philippines, and a soda-ash project
in Thailand). None of these AIPs was implemented as no agreement could
be reached on the monopoly rights claimed by such regional industries.
As a substitute, the ASEAN Industrial Complementation Scheme (AIC)
was launched by ASEAN governments in 1980 which was intended to be a
package of various forward and backward linked products. At least four56
member countries were intended to participate in such a package, e.g.
in the automotive industry. Again, AICs never arrived at the stage of
implementation. The third and least ambitious scheme was the ASEAN
Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV), in which residents from at least two
member countries should hold a majority ownership of at least 51 per
cent in order to qualify for preferential treatment and other privileges.
The record of the AIJVs is less obvious than that of the AIPs and the
AICs but it seems that in spite of improvements of privileges agreed
upon by the ASEAN Summit in December 1987 the AIJVs have not been
attractive to local businessmen. Some approvals of AIJVs were given but
whether intended industrial cooperation between private capital owners
from various ASEAN member states was really implemented has remained
open. In total, the record of industrial cooperation within ASEAN has
been discouraging.
To summarise, ASEAN owes its worldwide acceptance as a dialogue
partner for OECD countries not to its progress in internal integration
and industrial cooperation but to other factors. To mention four of them:
Firtstly, ASEAN was founded as an institution to formulate and
represent commcn interests of its members in foreign affairs (Vietnam,
Kampuchea). It succeeded to generate common positions on these issues
and to sustain these positions over a longer period of time.
Secondly, its member countries shared common views on the prin-
ciples of a division of labour between the private and the public sector.
Basically, all ASEAN member countries were efficiency-oriented and - as
a region - belonged to the most prosperous economic entities in the
world throughout two decades. Again, this perception of market forces
as the driving element of development is still accepted in the member
countries and has become even stronger as a policy guideline over time
[Hughes, 1989].
Thirdly, ASEAN member countries have established a strong in-
ternal network of consultations and software cooperation without surren-
dering national sovereignty in major economic policies. This network
contributes to lower costs of information and makes national policies more
predictable for neighbouring countries.
Fourthly, ASEAN runs permanent dialogues with the major OECD
countries on market accessibility and achieved some success in raising its
collective bargaining power, e.g. in dialogues with the EC on the Gener-57
alised System of Preferences (GSP) and the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA)
[ Lang hammer, 1985 ].
As a relatively small grouping in terms of members trends towards
bilateralism have not been as strong in ASEAN as in other integration
schemes. Probably, the fact that ASEAN was more outward-oriented in
its objectives and from the very beginning far less ambitious with re-
spect to internal integration than for instance the LAFTA has contrib-
uted to more multilateralism. Software cooperation, e.g. in science and
technology, culture and information, social development, and sectoral
policies, is institutionally channelled throughout respective ASEAN com-
mittees and has received increasing attention [ASEAN, 1988].
V. Recent Changes in RIDC
RIDC has experienced a number of new approaches and initiatives
in the 1980s which have not yet been fully implemented in many cases.
To evaluate them, three strands of changes - compared to the 1960s and
1970s - can be sketched:
1) There has been a shift from preannounced internal integration sched-
ules via free trade areas, customs unions and common markets to less
binding project-oriented cooperation schemes.
2) Within integration arrangements options for pursuing regional trade
liberalisation "at different speeds" were widened allowing individual
members to proceed more rapidly than others, to negotiate bilateral
preferences with partners sharing common sectoral interests and to
keep such agreements open to other member countries for future
participation.
3) Within cooperation schemes regional industrialisation planning or pro-
gramming lost its priority compared to cooperation in hardware (e.g.
physical infrastructure, communication, transport) or in software
(training, research, technology).
The shift to cooperation schemes is visible in all major regional
groupings. There is no scheme today which has not learnt the lesson
that copying the example of the EC does not work under conditions
prevailing in developing countries. The straightforward way to liberal-
ising goods and factor movements by pre-committing the members to a58
stages approach has been left. Instead of binding schedules, discre-
tionary actions prevail.
Alternatives (2) and (3) have emerged in the various groupings.
Schemes geared at dismantling internal barriers to imports from member
countries at a multilateral level have provided more leeway for bilateral-
ism.
The outstanding example in Latin America is the case of Brazil-
Argentina in the framework of LAIA. Institutionalised cooperation started
in 1983 and since that time has materialised in an agreement on duty-free
bilateral trade. By the end of 1990, at least 50 per cent of capital goods
traded between the two countries are to be granted preferential access.
A 1988 arrangement specifies upper limits for bilateral trade imbalances
in preferential trade. They are intended to free the agreement in its
operation from the well-known distribution conflicts. Even more important
than the tariff cuts is the intended dismantling of NTBs for up to 50 per
cent of total trade in industrial food products until 1993.
Examples for alternative (3) are schemes like the Andean Group or
ASEAN which have switched from regional industrialisation to other
means of cooperation.
These developments have similar implications for the decision-making
process. If ever supranational authorities had power to decide or to fix
rules, this power has vanished. National authorities have regained or
maintained their rights to decide. Common secretariats either have mail-
box functions only or provide technical assistance to national govern-
ments.
The variety of common projects has largely increased in the course
of cooperation with multi-tier axles and so has the demand for technical
expertise and financial resources along with the process of replacing
integration by cooperation. Demand can often not be satisfied from re-
gional sources. This holds especially for Sub-Saharan African groupings
where expertise and resources keeping the schemes alive have been in-
creasingly imported from nonmember countries, e.g. OECD countries and
the Arab oil exporters. Such reliance on external funds gives rise to
concerns that the necessity of self-defining common projects and bearing
the responsibility of funding them from own resources is watered as is
the internal clearing process of burden sharing.59
E. Lessons from the Experiences with RIDC
I. The Balance of Failure and Success
The analysis of RIDC presented in Chapter D leads to the conclu-
sion that the expected benefits from regional integration (Chapter B)
have not materialised. Irrespective of initial political and economic
conditions and despite numerous integration and cooperation efforts,
RIDC has failed to offer a viable development strategy for the catching -
up process. If member countries of integration schemes have achieved
sustained economic growth and social development such as the Southeast
Asian countries, Brazil, and Kenya as well as the Ivory Coast in the
1960s and early 1970s, they were not successful because of RIDC but in
spite of RIDC. RIDC has at best promoted trade diversion and a pro-
longed process of inefficient regional import substitution.
The reasons for the failure of RIDC are internal rather than ex-
ternal. International economic conditions deteriorated in the 1970s and
1980s, but the roots of disintegration can be traced back to the late
1960s and early 1970s, before the first oil price shock hit. Cases in
point are the 1968 crisis of LAFTA, the break-down of the CACM in
1969, the suspension of duty-free intraregional trade in the EAC in
1967, or the distributional conflicts paralysing the CACEU in 1968. Ex-
ternal factors may have prevented a revitalisation of stagnating integra-
tion efforts; however, they did not cause stagnation or even disinte-
gration. RIDC failed because integration policies were implemented half-
heartedly and often in an inconsistent fashion, were abolished after a
relatively short period of time, or were neutralised by new, mostly
NTBs:
Member countries of most so-called customs unions did never grant
duty-free market access to each other, and efforts towards trade
liberalisation were either limited to more or less redundant TBs or
were aborted early. Even customs unions inherited from the colonial
past such as the EAC and the two francophone Unions in West and
Central Africa soon broke up after the member states gained indepen-
dence or disintegrated because new tariffs or NTBs were erected.
Regional investment planning was high on the agenda of integration
schemes in Latin America, Africa and Asia. A multitude of different60
joint projects was envisaged and in many cases even agreed upon in
ministerial meetings, but most of them were never carried out because
of disputes over financing or management issues. Some projects that
were actually carried out soon lost their economic importance since
one or more of the initial partners decided to set up competing units
in their own countries (e.g. production of tyres in the CACM or the
common oil refinery in the CACEU).
And finally, the internal mechanics of RIDC were not sufficiently
developed. Compensation schemes for weak partner countries and
clearing facilities were either not established or available funds had
remained utterly insufficient to provide incentives for regional trade
liberalisation. Likewise, adjustments of macroeconomic policies which
would have been a prerequisite for regional trade creation did not
make much progress. In particular, necessary exchange rate changes
which could improve the competitive position of weak partner coun-
tries have remained halfhearted or were entirely avoided.
What remains on the asset side of RIDC are such intangibles as an
improved flow of information across borders that may improve mutual
understanding, and some scattered examples of relatively successful
regional cooperation such as the joint bargaining of ASEAN countries in
international trade negotiations, the joint efforts to attract foreign aid
by SADCC and ECOWAS, as well as common projects to solve specific
bilateral or multilateral problems (Interstate Committee to Fight Drought
in the Sahel; ASEAN cooperation in training, research and communica-
tion). Measured in terms of the initial expectations associated with RIDC
these "successes" have to be rated as by-products while the main pro-
duct was not delivered.
II. Political Reasons for Failure
RIDC among independent nations entails a certain loss of sovereign-
ty for each member country. This has proven to be a stumbling bloc for
integration among young independent nations, particularly in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa. The colonial heritage often combined with the necessity to
forge a national consensus among rival tribes or social groups has made
governments of these countries extremely reluctant to forego even minor61
parts of their newly acquired political independence. Thus, the imple-
mentation of integration policies was sacrificed on the altar of a new
nationalism.
Such political constraints to regional integration were exacerbated in
cases of political instability and border conflicts. Civil war and social
unrest (El Salvador, Nicaragua) left attempts towards a CACM hanging
in the air, as did bilateral military conflicts such as between Honduras
and El Salvador in 1969. Latin American integration efforts suffered from
successive military coups in various countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Peru) while similar events (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria)
have undermined African economic integration schemes [UN, 1988]. Re-
current border conflicts among East and West African countries consti-
tuted another impediment to integration in Sub-Saharan Africa.
In addition to nationalism and political instability, contradictory
political ideologies, i. e. a lacking consensus on a market-oriented ap-
proach, has been a reason for stagnating or abolished integration. Cases
in point were central planning in Tanzania or Peru versus market eco-
nomy in Kenia and Chile. All in all, however, political obstacles to RIDC
should not be overestimated. Political problems have been decisive for
not implementing integration policies in some countries at certain times,
but they do not provide a sufficient explanation why RIDC has not
yielded the desired results across continents and over time.
III. Economic Reasons for Failure
1. A Deteriorating External Economic Environment
The establishment of customs unions or common markets among
developing countries requires an adjustment of production structures and
at least some degree of policy reform in each member country. Focal
points are incentives for new private investment as well as budgetary
and monetary discipline. The willingness of governments to shoulder the
burden of restructuring the private and the public sector depends,
among other things to be discussed below, on budgetary and balance-of-
payments constraints under which these governments have to operate.
Experience in both industrialised and developing countries shows that62
adjustment is much easier to accomplish under conditions of buoyant
external demand and steadily expanding export revenues. For RIDC, a
prosperous and stable external environment is particularly important
since intraregional trade and capital flows are not able to offset a re-
cessional impact of world markets in the short to medium run given the
initially low shares of intraregional economic transactions.
Viewed from this perspective, world economic conditions have not
been very favourable to RIDC in the last two decades. Successive deep
economic recessions in industrialised countries (1967/68, 1975/76, 1981/
82), the two oil price shocks and a considerable slow down of world
trade growth in the 1970s and 1980s compared to the 1960s have added
to the volatility of export earnings and aggravated balance of payments
problems for many developing countries [cf. e.g. Nunnenkamp, 1986,
Chapter 5]. Exporters of manufactures in Latin America and Asia had to
surmount increasing protectionist barriers in OECD countries while their
import bill soared due to higher oil prices. Commodity dependent coun-
tries in Central America and in Africa suffered from volatile commodity
prices and a secular decline of their barter terms of trade.
Price instability has caused concern because it is believed to raise
risks for traders, producers and consumers and to contribute to the
instability of export earnings, imports, investment and government ex-
penditure. For example, through licence fees, export taxes, government-
owned companies and marketing boards, primary commodity production is
a major source of government revenues. These revenues become, there-
fore, almost as volatile as the commodity prices, hampering budget plan-
ning, and increasing the risk of large deficits and stop-and-go spending
policies with detrimental effects on long-term public investment pro-
grammes and the riskiness of private investment. In such a framework,
the implementation of integration policies may indeed become ineffectual.
According to the World Bank [1986], the terms of trade movements
of commodity dependent countries have in general followed closely the
real price trends. The barter terms of trade for major developing
country regions show a general decline over the past decades. The de-
cline has been especially severe for Africa, which has a large number of
commodity exporting developing countries. On the other hand, the move-
ment of the income terms of trade show substantial differences between
regions. This suggests that Southeast Asia, for example, has been able63
to increase productivity and volume of exports to maintain or even in-
crease revenues from commodity exports despite unfavourable price
movements. In Africa, income terms of trade have remained in line with
barter terms of trade suggesting that the adverse export price develop-
ments have rather been aggravated by low or declining growth in export
volumes. This can reflect low productivity in the production of commodi-
ties and/or a loss of market shares to more competitive or aggressive
exporters of the same commodities in other regions.
Another important impediment to RIDC is rooted in the increasing
(private and public) debt burden of many Latin American and African
countries. High debt service obligations have made external financing
more difficult and have cut investment programmes via related austerity
measures. Much of the foreign debt had been incurred when export
prices were higher and the medium-term outlook for exports more buoy-
ant. As the terms of trade deteriorated, the burden of debt service
grew. In part, these developments were connected, as countries resorted
to increased borrowing in order to finance urgent imports and to meet
maturing debt obligations. The consequences of this borrowing was that
the debt of these countries rose rapidly relative to their export earn-
ings, as did interest payments. The (net) effect of these developments
has been to impose severe adjustment and import restraints. As a result,
incomes have been reduced and development programmes disrupted.
Furthermore, countries facing a debt crisis reduced their willingness to
hold nonconvertible assets and urged for shorter settlement periods in
multilateral clearing arrangements. This behaviour contributed to the
suspension of the arrangements.
Whether or not the undeniably detrimental external developments
have had a decisive influence on the ability of developing countries to
implement integration policies remains doubtful, though. This doubt is
based on the observation that individual countries have performed very
differently under the same external threats. Empirical studies on the
presumed negative impact of price and earnings volatility on growth have
been inconclusive [MacBean, Nguyen, 1987]. Instability in export earn-
ings may be only one, and not necessarily a dominant influence on eco-
nomic growth, and the impact on investment, imports and income was
very different among countries, reflecting also offsetting policy actions
supported by adequate reserves or external borrowing. It is also note-64
worthy that commodity dependent countries which have experienced
higher growth rates of real gross domestic product (GDP) in 1980-1986
than in the previous period (1965-1980) have been faced with falling
barter terms of trade while all those countries which were expected to
benefit from rising terms of trade performed worse [ OECD, 1989, p. 14].
And finally, manufactured exports from Southeast Asia and countries like
Brazil have continued to expand at a rapid pace despite slower world
trade growth and increasing protectionism in industrialised countries.
The conclusion is that the deteriorating external environment was harm-
ful to economic development and made adjustment more difficult, but the
evidence seems to point to the importance of other factors than the ex-
ternal environment in explaining stagnating or disrupted integration
efforts.
a. Barriers to Trade and Factor Mobility
It has been frequently mentioned above (Chapters D and E. I) that
more intraregional specialisation did not materialise because there was a
strong resistance in virtually all regional groupings against a significant
reduction of TBs and impediments to factor mobility. In Sub-Saharan
Africa, ECOWAS has consistently failed to implement decisions concerning
trade liberalisation. In recent tariff reforms in Nigeria and Ghana, no
account was taken of the agreement to initially freeze and then lower
tariffs to ECOWAS members. Similar experiences have been made in the
CACEU where the taxe unique became an effective import duty, and in
the PTA where there was hardly any preferential trade in the subregion
after the PTA was established [Granberg, 1985]. Unwillingness to im-
plement trade liberalisation is by no means restricted to Africa, though.
CARICOM has failed to agree on the implementation of the previously
agreed elimination of all TBs within the region, and ASEAN has not been
very successful in the mutual dismantling of TBs either.
This resistance against external liberalisation is all the more im-
portant since barriers to trade and factor mobility are usually much
higher among developing countries than in industrialised countries. This
applies in particular to TBs and NTBs [World Bank, 1987, Chapter 8].
In some regions, NTBs also tend to be much more variable in scope and65
extent so that effective protection fluctuates significantly from year to
year as the result of the allocation of import licences and foreign ex-
change authorisations. High barriers to trade discourage export expan-
sion in general, and differences among barriers to trade of developing
and industrialised countries provide an incentive for extraregional in-
stead of intraregional trade.
In a similar vain, most regional groupings have maintained extensive
restrictions against capital flows and the movement of labour. Under
current circumstances trade is unlikely to promote investment for pro-
duction in the importing country. It is also difficult to rationalise pro-
duction through takeovers, mergers and acquisitions and this sustains
high costs that require extensive protection from imports. Foreign firms
also often face regulatory and tax frameworks different from those con-
fronted by domestic firms. Especially in low-income countries, large
segments of the manufacturing sector tend to be reserved for public
enterprises. Likewise, immigration rules or job entry regulations prevent
labour to move from backward to more prosperous countries within the
regional grouping as it would happen within a country to the benefit of
both backward and prosperous areas. Thus, labour mobility has been
confined to informal markets and specific sectors such as seasonal agri-
cultural labour migration between Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast.
Factor mobility is not a substitute but rather an engine of trade
expansion [ Hiemenz, Langhammer et al. , 1987, Chapter D]. Investment
in the partner country often complements domestic production and im-
proves the intraregional specialisation. Labour movements can help to
alleviate labour shortages in prospering countries, and income remit-
tances increase demand in the home countries of migrant labour. All
these opportunities have not been exploited in RIDC. Recently, only the
ASEAN countries have undertaken some very cautious steps towards
facilitating the transfer of capital among member countries [ ASEAN,
1988, pp. 17-20].
b. Macroeconomic Policies
The most serious impediments to greater regional economic coopera-
tion and trade have emerged from unintended side-effects of inappropri-66
ate and uncoordinated macroeconomic policies. An excessive reliance on
public sector activities at the expense of the private sector has resulted
in expansionary fiscal and monetary policies which in turn have
strengthened inflationary pressures and an accumulation of public debt.
The undesirable consequences were overvalued exchange rates and a
crowding out of private investors. Overvalued exchange rates have the
twofold disadvantage of discriminating against exports and of reducing
and destabilising imports. This holds as export prices in foreign cur-
rency are artificially increased, and the shortage of foreign exchange
associated with overvaluation requires rationing of foreign exchange
available for imports. Both the wrong price signals and rationing tend to
discourage intraregional trade. Imports from partner countries may be
too expensive compared to other suppliers, and rationing usually favours
suppliers of essential raw materials (oil) and investment goods in indus-
trialised countries or the Middle East.
Another impediment to the expansion of intraregional trade arises
from the lacking convertibility of national currencies which is a corollary
to inappropriate macroeconomic policies. Nonconvertibility increases
transaction costs of traders and investors, in particular when there are
foreign exchange shortages. To remedy this problem, several regional
groupings have maintained monetary unions or introduced clearing ar-
rangements as second-best solutions [for details, cf. Fischer, 1983;
Appendix Table 3]. The West African monetary union under the auspices
of the French Central Bank is the main survivor of attempts to facilitate
financing by maintaining fixed exchange rates among member countries.
However, there is ample evidence for various member countries of the
Franc Zone that fixed exchange rates have resulted in an overvaluation
of the common currency, albeit to a different degree in different coun-
tries [ Devarajan, Melo, 1987; Milner, 1990], and that access to French
capital markets can - at least no longer - offset the damaging effects of
overvaluation. Overvaluation is also the major reason why the CACEU,
despite using a convertible currency, has much less intraregional trade
than other groupings with more binding foreign exchange constraints.
Clearing arrangements have not proven to provide a solution to
foreign exchange shortages either. A major reason was that financial
balances tilted in favour of the dominating partner countries which were
not prepared to keep large amounts of nonconvertible currencies in their67
portfolio. Further problems arose since financial resources for credit
arrangements remained limited as refinancing in international capital
markets suffered from the low creditworthiness of member countries.
c. Low Gains from Integration
Efforts towards RIDC, no matter whether they were undertaken in
Asia, Africa or Latin America, have always been crippled by the fear of
economic domination by a large or more advanced partner country.
Typical examples were Nigeria within ECOWAS or Brazil within LAFTA.
ASEAN economic integration stagnated because it was sandwiched between
highly industrialised Singapore and poor, but vast Indonesia. The fear
of domination grew out of the belief that integration should lead to "bal-
anced" growth with an "equal" share of industry in each member
country. This is, however, a mistaken proposition if economic integration
is to improve resource use and allocation and hence, leads to a concen-
tration of certain industries in one or another member country. There-
fore, the income distribution among member countries may not necessarily
improve in short to medium run since weaker members may loose inef-
ficient industries established behind protective barriers and incur losses
of government revenues from tariffs and taxes as a result of trade liber-
alisation.
In such a situation, weaker member countries stand to loose from
integration initially and will demand financial compensation from more
successful members. Such compensation schemes have actually been es-
tablished in the WAEC, the CACEU and the EAC, but they could not
prevent a final stalemate of integration efforts in these groupings. The
reason for this failure was that compensation payments were considered
to be inadequate by weaker members and/or that stronger members were
not prepared to shoulder a higher burden. The economic rationale of this
result is easily explained. Weaker members suffer from trade liberali-
sation in the first round while benefits from improved specialisation take
time to materialise, in particular when factors of production are not
allowed to move freely as was the case in most regional groupings. More
advanced countries have already entered, at least to some degree, in the
international division of labour and benefit only marginally from trade68
and other concessions granted by the weaker, less developed member
countries. This may very well amount to a setting in which the relative
gainers are unable to compensate the relative losers "sufficiently" unless
they give up virtually all their gains.
Similar considerations apply to integration among partners with a
similar level of development and similar resource endowments such as the
CACM or CARICOM. In such regional groupings there is little scope for
interindustry specialisation since member countries tend to possess com-
parative advantages in the same products. Given the relatively low level
of development, intraindustry specialisation does not offer an option
either. Therefore, gains from integration are likely to remain low and
uncertain as it is difficult to foresee in which way the regional pattern
of production may be altered. Member countries which lose locational
advantages in the production of certain products cannot be sure to be
compensated by becoming attractive for other industries. Integration is,
therefore, carried out in a slow and, more importantly, selective fashion
which further reduces the gains emerging from trade concessions. In the
end, there is very little incentive to continue to grant preferences or to
pay compensation.
IV. Politico-Economic Reasons
1. The Political Economy of International Coordination
The above assessment of potential and actual gains from RIDC
points to politico-economic aspects of integration and cooperation efforts.
If governments can be assumed to behave rationally, they will cooperate
with other countries in such a way as to maximise the utility of their
own countries. The implications of this assumption for economic coordi-
nation among independent nations have been elaborated in the theory of
clubs [as summarised in Fratianni, Pattison, 1982]. This reasoning ap-
plies to the case of RIDC as a special form of international coordination
which allows to implement the exclusion principle, i. e. concessions can
be restricted to member countries. For the membership in such clubs the
following considerations are valid:
Each country assesses the individual benefits and costs of the mem-69
bership in a regional grouping. Decisions are made on the basis of
the country's net benefits, and not on the basis of benefits achieved
by the integration scheme as a whole.
The larger the number of members in an integration scheme, the
lower is the marginal benefit derived from an additional member for
each of the old members.
Membership costs are not equal for all members. In particular, addi-
tion of a new member will raise the costs of finding agreement, e.g.
on preferential tariffs, in a more than proportionate manner since
decisions have to reflect both the interests of old and of new mem-
bers. Hence, finding agreement grows more costly with an increasing
number of members, or excluding a marginal member may increase net
benefits of the integration scheme derived by the remaining members.
Governments tend to focus on financial flows rather than on total
economic benefits and costs, when deciding on membership. Compen-
sation payments or loss of government revenues as consequences of
economic integration lend themselves much easier to a public demon-
stration of benefits and costs associated with membership than poten-
tial net gains from specialisation. Therefore, politicians prefer to
argue on the basis of visible flows.
Judged by these criteria the crisis of RIDC appears in a different
perspective. Lacking implementation of integration policies, new barriers
to trade or exit from integration schemes were not so much cases of
policy failure but rather the result of a rational economic calculus by
governments of member countries. This is most obvious for countries
which left customs unions such as Chad (CACEU), Benin (WAEC), Tan-
zania (EAC) or Honduras (CACM). To cancel membership was preferable
because
individual cost-benefit comparisons on the basis of visible flows had
turned out to be negative,
they had to shoulder higher costs than other members of the customs
union and they were not able to win sufficient special concessions
from other members to lower these costs,
leading members of the respective customs unions did not consider
their membership as beneficial enough for themselves to offer suffi-
cient compensation payments.
The political economy of international coordination does also provide70
an explanation for other phenomena observed in the context of RIDC
such as external cooperation without integration or the recent trends
towards bilateralism. The advantage of bilateralism is obvious since two
in general more advanced countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, with
a different pattern of specialisation, can more easily find areas of
common interest for partial deregulation. Selective trade liberalisation for
specific products can provide access to new markets in the neighbouring
country without generating adjustment pressures for other internationally
not competitive industries.
External cooperation of regional groupings against an actual or
perceived common threat (ASEAN, SADCC) is beneficial to member coun-
tries since they are jointly more successful in acquiring advantages than
they would be on their own. Such advantages can take the form of poli-
tical protection and military security (ASEAN) or they may materialise in
an increased flow of development aid (SADCC). Net benefits are maxi-
mised when member countries minimise the costs of cooperation once
external support has been secured. Although foreign support is tied to
e.g. development projects or military spending, there are various av-
enues to reduce the costs of cooperation by avoiding economic integra-
tion. Thanks to the fungibility of funds governments can use their own
resources in a way detrimental to integration: integration can be narrow-
ed down to some marginal areas of common interest which then amounts
to economic cooperation in some selected areas; or governments may
simply not implement deregulation policies required for a free movement
of goods and factors of production within the regional grouping.
2. Vested Interests
Underneath the political economy of international coordination there
is a second (more microeconomic) layer of politico-economic influences on
government decision making. Governments are either subject to the pres-
sure of strong interest groups which oppose liberalisation that would
expose inefficient import substitution activities to foreign competition. Or
politicians and bureaucrats themselves may benefit from import substitu-
tion policies through their stake in inefficient public or private enter-
prises or their control over NTBs such as import quotas, licences, and71
foreign exchange allocations. Rationing allows them to make profits from
illegal sales and corruption. The subordination of government decisions
under individual welfare considerations has manifested itself in the de-
pendence of politicians on influential businessmen in Latin America [e.g.
Morawetz, 1981, pp. 98-99, 156-157] and the "personal rule" of parasitic
elites in Africa [Bates, 1981; 1983; Jackson, Rosberg, 1982, p. 84;
Sandbrook, 1985; 1986] or the emergence of a nonproductive state class
living on rents [Elsenhans, 1984]. Vested interests in Africa further
emerge from the competition among ethnical groups for political power
and economic influence within individual countries that has resulted in
the adoption of restrictions on firms that could benefit from trade liber-
alisation, e.g. in ECOWAS and the PTA.
The history of RIDC provides ample evidence for the influence of
vested interests on the failure of integration efforts. Under inward-
oriented trade regimes, many multinational companies have invested in
neighbouring countries to supply domestic markets and earned the rents
to be derived from protectionism. Those companies are not interested in
trade liberalisation and will put pressure on government officials to pre-
vent a change of the trade regime. Such pressure can be brought to
bear particularly in many small African countries with only few major
foreign investors [Robson, 1985, p. 615]. Such an example is the Bata
shoe manufacturer which has subsidiaries in Benin, Burkina Faso, Came-
roon, Central African Republic, Congo, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Sene-
gal, and Togo [ Ediafric, 1987]. Another example concerns the production
of aluminium household utensils by a French multinational in West and
Central African countries [ Agarwal et al. , 1985, p. 103]. Similar pat-
terns characterise the production of textiles and bicycles. Trade liber-
alisation among members of WAEC and CACEU would inevitably render
some of these subsidiaries obsolete and is likely to reduce overall profits
since production would have to be relocated to the least protectionist
country.
The unwillingness to rely on the private sector in many African
countries [Nellis, 1986] has led to the establishment of a few large pub-
lic enterprises dominating the industrial sector. The destiny of these
enterprises is often intimately intertwined with the interests of politicians
and bureaucrats who seek to protect state enterprises by maintaining or
even erecting new trade barriers contrary to the principles of integra-72
tion they themselves had agreed to. Incidence for such a collusion of
interests can be found in the penetration of public enterprises by gov-
ernment officials as was the case with military men usurping the com-
manding heights of public and semipublic companies in Nigeria [Berg-
stresser, 1988].73
F. Agenda for Policy Action
I. Promoting Cooperation and not Integration
The summary of experiences with RIDC presented in the preceding
chapter is not encouraging. Viewed against the initial intentions to pro-
mote economic and social development by providing a training ground for
infant economies, RIDC has more or less failed [cf. also Inotai, 1986,
pp. 222 f. ]. Regional trade did not offer a viable alternative to trade
with industrialised countries and could not offset the disadvantages of an
excessive import substitution policy applied in most member countries of
regional groupings. Vested interests at the micro level as well as the
meagre gains from such trade for the countries concerned soon discour-
aged further integration efforts or even led to a reversal of trade lib-
eralisation and joint investment planning. Economic integration continued
to be advocated in political fora, but has lost any influence on actual
policy making for at least 15 years. The almost total dissatisfaction with
regional trade liberalisation is growing out of the observation that vir-
tually no success case can be cited in which this approach itself was
instrumental in enhancing development processes in member countries.
Even in ASEAN countries economic prosperity was rather derived from
domestic policy reform than from regional integration.
For the purpose of policy conclusions, it is important to stress that
the dismal results of RIDC did not so much result from a misperception
of the potential embodied in regional trade integration, but from the lack
of incentives to implement integration policies in the given situation. It
has turned out that RIDC cannot be a substitute for appropriate domes-
tic economic policies. With wrong exchange rates, high barriers to trade,
misleading investment incentives, and a high degree of government par-
ticipation in economic activities, patterns of production and trade are
distorted in such a way that economic integration does not offer many
benefits to those gaining from the domestic economic policy regime.
Therefore, they oppose regional economic liberalisation as much as they
oppose opening up towards world markets. This opposition could not be
overruled since politicians either have direct vested interests in distort-
ed patterns of production and trade (Africa) or private pressure groups
command sufficient resources to influence government decisions (Latin74
America).
Compensation payments do not open a way out of this politico-eco-
nomic stalemate either. Regional import substitution as a substitute for
national import substitution does not produce significant gains from trade
or factor mobility especially if the majority of the regional counterparts
is economically weak. Immediate losses of government revenues as well as
employment and output in obsolete industries in weak partner countries
create a demand for compensation which is not met by the more advanced
countries expecting relatively low and often uncertain medium term
gains. To remedy this situation by replenishing compensation funds from
external (bilateral or multilateral) sources is hardly an option for several
reasons. Given the difficulties of assessing the amount and duration of
economically justified compensation, developmental considerations are
likely to be substituted by a political bargaining process. The question
then is who is being paid for what, i.e. the purpose of disbursing ex-
ternal funds becomes unclear, and more advanced member countries may
easily feel to be at a disadvantage since they do not benefit from similar
support. And finally, compensation payments required to break the op-
position of vested interests may be out of proportion compared to the
envisaged benefits from integration. This casts doubt on the develop-
mental impact of external funds used for this purpose and may also
become questionable from a distributional point of view.
The bottomline of the experiences with RIDC is that economic inte-
gration in the traditional sense (customs unions, common markets, joint
investment planning) has proven not to be viable. There seems to be no
alternative to trade liberalisation on a nondiscriminatory basis. What
remains are scattered examples of regional cooperation in specific areas
of common interest among partner countries. Such common interests were
found in the dealing with actual or perceived external threats or in the
joint production of public goods (education, research and development
(R&D), infrastructure, environment) which would have been too costly
for individual countries (ASEAN, GCC, SADCC, ECOWAS). Turning from
the past to the future, the latter appears to offer the only starting
point for a promotion of RIDC. Human resource development, food secur-
ity, expansion of R<£D especially in agriculture, energy management,
environment problems, international marketing and improved flows of
information and communication represent severe bottlenecks to economic75
development, particularly in the poorer countries of Africa and Central
America, which could be widened by intraregional cooperation. By its
very nature, this type of cooperation will, however, be very selective
and country-specific. It will not lend itself to large-scale aid projects,
but rather have to focus on the provision of "software" such as the
design of appropriate joint policies of partner countries and the estab-
lishment of joint management or control facilities. "Hardware" require-
ments such as infrastructure or equipment should be derived from soft-
ware-oriented projects and programmes and not be anticipated as inde-
pendent tasks because all efforts towards a joint provision of railway
links, energy supply and other infrastructure have been fraught with
almost unsurmountable financing and management difficulties.
The success of regional cooperation in lieu of integration hinges on
several preconditions. Firstly, the initiative for cooperation has to come
from within the countries concerned. Frequently aborted IMF (Inter-
national Monetary Fund) and World Bank adjustment programmes have
proven that an appropriate macro and sector policy management cannot
be imposed externally. The same applies even more to regional cooper-
ation. The strategic policy changes towards encouraging cooperation have
to emerge from the desire of the countries themselves to engage in a
partnership with external donors mainly playing a catalytic role. Except
for technical assistance in policy analysis and policy implementation,
there are fewer external donors which could directly contribute to set-
ting the wheel in motion.
The second prerequisite for successful regional cooperation is dom-
estic policy reform in the participating countries. As long as misguided
incentive systems distort the pattern of production and trade, there is
also not much scope for successful regional cooperation. Empirical evi-
dence of the past three decades has clearly highlighted the importance of
a stable macroeconomic environment, i. e. stable monetary and fiscal
policies, and the critical role of prices, in particular the exchange rate,
for economic development. Unless governments reduce their role to pro-
viding an appropriate economic framework for the initiatives of individual
economic agents, i. e. farmers, entrepreneurs and traders, gains from
regional cooperation are easily foregone because it is difficult to detect
promising areas for cooperation in a highly distorted environment and
because the joint production of public goods will not be met by the76
necessary response of private agents. This response is required, how-
ever, if cooperation among governments is to be translated into more
production and employment.
Finally, regional cooperation should not be discouraged by the ex-
ternal economic environment that participating countries are facing. If
cooperation is to be successful in the sense that diversification into new
economic activities and a division of labour among partner countries are
promoted it is the task of OECD countries to provide unrestricted access
to their markets for products originating from regional groupings. This
precondition seems to be fulfilled given the far-reaching special and
general preferences for low-income countries (Lome Agreement, Carib-
bean Basin Initiative, GSP), but some subtle protectionist remnants are
still embodied in preferential trading arrangements that discriminate in
particular against an intraregional division of labour as will be discussed
below.
II. The Potential Contributions of Bilateral and Multilateral Donors
V
1. Review of OECD Countries' Policies
To provide access to all OECD markets and to secure an uninter-
rupted availability of imports is an essential and indispensable part of
OECD support for economic development in Third World countries in
general [ Hiemenz, 1989]. What matters in the context of regional co-
operation are, firstly, agricultural protectionism in OECD countries and
the associated distribution of surplus production in the form of food aid
which discourage joint food security policies on a regional level. Arti-
ficially lowered world market prices and policy-induced price insta-
bilities constitute disincentives for local agricultural production and
raise the market risk of developing countries in food trade.
Secondly, protectionist instruments embodied in preferential trading
arrangements are subtle but by no means ineffective since they have
discouraged efforts to establish internationally competitive lines of pro-
1 Anderson, Tyres [1986]; Tyers, Anderson [1988, pp. 285 f. ];
Valdes, Zietz [1980].77
duction and nourished export pessimism of potential investors, above all
in economically weak countries. In particular, rules of origin are too
restrictive given the stage of industrialisation in economically weak
countries. They prevent these countries not only from attracting "fin-
ishing touch" activities which can be a first step towards developing an
indigenous industrial sector, but also from engaging in a vertical div-
2 ision of labour among regional partner countries.
2. Support for Domestic Policy Reform
As elaborated above domestic policy reform will greatly improve the
scope for and the gains from economic cooperation. Structural adjustment
loans granted under the auspices of IMF and World Bank have supported
domestic policy reforms in the past, but these efforts have met severe
constraints, and the final outcome is highly uncertain in many cases
[World Bank, 1988a; 1988b, p. 28]. There are at least two major reasons
for the lagging progress with policy reform in many developing countries
suffering from severe policy-induced distortions. Firstly, empirical evi-
dence suggests that external financial support for governments under-
taking economic reforms has lagged behind their needs in the past
[ Gulhati, Nallari, 1988]. According to this evidence, it was at least
partly due to lacking aid response, particularly by bilateral donors, that
policy reforms were abandoned or stagnated in several African countries
such as Malawi, Zaire, Zambia, and Uganda. A reward of reform efforts
will, of course, require the specification of criteria upon which aid dis-
bursements can be based.
And secondly, as politico-economic constraints and institutional
weaknesses were identified as major bottlenecks for development in many
countries, external assistance may have to focus on rather fundamental
issues before a successful policy reform can be implemented. In countries
1 Agarwal et al. [1985, Section IV]; McQueen [1982]; McQueen,
Yannopoulos [ 1989].
2
The EC has introduced cumulative rules of origin for three regional
groupings (CACM, ASEAN, Andean Group) in its GSP, but only for a
limited range of products and under restrictive conditions.78
characterised by strong vested interests development aid should be
geared towards institution building, human resource development, control
of population growth and other poverty-related areas [ Hiemenz, 1989].
This "software" orientation deserves much greater attention in the future
design of aid programmes since it will not only pave the way to domestic
policy reform, but also facilitate the political economy of economic co-
operation.
3. Support for Economic Cooperation
The preceding section has highlighted a number of areas suited for
economic cooperation among developing countries which would fit into
domestic policy reform programmes. Given the politico-economic con-
straints for policy making in these countries that have been elaborated
above, the desire for cooperation will emerge only in cases when co-
operation serves mutual interests, i.e. when participating countries
stand to gain from cooperation in a similar manner and vested interests
can be overruled or compensated. These preconditions will, if at all, be
met in the joint production of public goods. The fact that a large num-
ber of such cooperation projects have already been implemented with
external support bears witness to this point. To encourage the design
and implementation of further projects and programmes the following
provides an overview of principal avenues to economic cooperation in the
production of public goods.
Government policies and public institutions provide a framework for
the activities of individual economic agents, and hence, there is scope
for cooperation in almost any market or sector of the economy. Coopera-
tion is likely to be most desirable and effective in the deregulation and
development of factor markets such as labour and capital markets or
science and technology, as well as in the design and implementation of
fiscal policies. Particularly in countries at an early stage of development,
there may also be great benefits to be gained from cooperation at the
sectoral level with respect to policies and institutions pertaining to food,
agriculture and forestry, industry, minerals and energy, or trade,
transport and communication. Concerning the type of cooperation a hier-
archical order is discernible depending on the loss of autonomous de-79
cision making required by cooperation. The possibilities stretch from a
mere exchange of information via the provision of joint training facilities
and via a mutual recognition and adaptation of rules and regulations to
the implementation of joint policies and, finally, the establishment of joint
institutions with at least quasi-legislative power. In principal, all types
of cooperations can be instituted in all areas of mutual interest among
participating countries.
An improved flow of information is almost inevitably a necessary
first step to lay the groundwork for economic cooperation. Institution-
alised access to information on rules and regulations implemented in
partner countries and on bureaucratic procedures such as customs and
tax administration, public procurement, or the evaluation of investment
applications will help bureaucrats and businessmen to assess the obstac-
les against and the potential for an expansion of economic activities
across borders. A timely publication of standardised statistical data is
another aspect of this type of cooperation, which may also require an
improvement of technical facilities available in administrations such as
computerisation. In addition, efforts can be undertaken to share infor-
mation on the external economic environment among partner countries.
There may be a joint interest in technologies, markets, barriers to
trade, and marketing channels in industrialised countries, and it may be
efficient to obtain this information jointly. If the perceived benefits of
pursuing a cooperative information policy are large enough, partner
countries may choose to go all the way to establishing common infor-
mation centres.
The lack of human capital generally constitutes a major bottleneck
to economic development. Both appropriate policy formulation and effi-
cient private decision making require a well-trained technocratic elite,
the emergence of which could be accelerated if countries cooperate in
training. There are many important subjects such as modern techniques
of government administration, the adaptation of Western technologies, the
functioning of labour and capital markets, and international trade and
marketing which may be suitable for joint training of senior administra-
tive staff and private entrepreneurs. The options for joint training
range from study tours and courses in existing institutions to the estab-
lishment of specialised joint training centres. They do also include the
development of curricula and teaching material.80
The cooperation projects discussed so far must be classified as
borderline cases of the production of public goods. In economically more
advanced countries such services may be supplied more efficiently by the
private sector. Therefore, an evaluation of these projects has to include
an assessment of the competition between public and private suppliers of
the respective services so as to prevent crowding-out of private sup-
pliers by, generally subsidised, public institutions. Such a precaution
does not have to be taken in joint efforts to improve the policy frame-
work for more economic exchange among partner countries. In its weak
form policy coordination may focus on streamlining and facilitating rules,
regulations and norms, adjusting customs, tax and other administrative
procedures, and mutual recognition of privileges or rights of access
obtained in member countries. The aim is to achieve greater trans-
parency of government intervention in markets and to standardise these
interventions among partner countries as much as possible to remove
barriers to access for people and goods.
A stronger form of policy coordination are joint policies which can
be of mutual benefit when policy implications cannot be limited to the
national economies. Potential candidates for such an approach are the
joint exploitation of internationally mobile resources, joint energy and
water management, environmental protection, control of population
growth, food security, and surveillance of air and marine transport,
fishing rights and trade in narcotics and weapons. This list is by no
means exhaustive, but all joint policies have in common that mutual
agreement has to be reached with respect to policy design and imple-
mentation. When decisions need to be made frequently, the establishment
of joint institutions endowed with certain administrative powers may be
preferable over tedious negotiations between government representatives.
Hence, the borderline between joint policies and joint institutions is thin.
Joint policies may be executed by surveillance bodies, agencies, or coun-
cils.
Another reason for establishing joint institutions is cost sharing.
The size of domestic demand and/or budgetary considerations may sug-
gest to pursue certain government activities on a cooperative basis with
other partner countries. Cases in point are e.g. research and training
centres for a wide range of mutually interesting subjects (agricultural
development, industrial technologies, banking, marketing, energy, envi-81
ronmental issues, climate, health, nutrition).
In establishing such institutions, it is an important consideration
that participating countries are extremely sensitive to an equal distribu-
tion of benefits derived from the activities of the institutions. Extended
discussions about the best location for a new institution are but one sign
of this sensitivity, and many joint institutions have stagnated or were
even dissolved because individual member countries did not make their
financial contributions or were dissatisfied with their benefits from co-
operation. The design of new institutions would, therefore, require a
careful assessment of the benefits derived by each individual member
country and, possibly, the introduction of monitoring devices which
increase the transparency of the distribution of costs and benefits.
Furthermore, the functioning of institutions may require some forms of
sanctions against member countries which fail to meet their commitments.
The overview of potential areas for successful cooperation among
developing countries clearly indicates the supplementary nature of such
efforts. Likewise, most cooperation projects or programmes are likely to
be small in terms of the required external financial support. Improving
the flow of information and policy coordination will in the first place be a
matter of providing technical assistance. Foreign exchange requirements
may arise in the context of rehabilitating existing institutions or creating
new ones. In economically weaker countries, the absorptive capacity for
such projects is however limited due to the scarcity of skilled personal.
For these reasons, the main thrust of external assistance should be
geared towards supporting domestic policy reform as outlined above.82
Appendix Tables
Table Al - Empirical Evidence for the "Training Ground" Argument -
Rank Spearman Correlation Coefficients Between Absolute










































































































Table A2 - Multilateral Clearing and Payments Arrangements of Devel-














































(a) First six months
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Source: ALADI [ b, 1989, No. 2]; UNCTAD [c].84
Table A3 - Intra-Group Trade as a Percentage of Total Exports of

























































































Secretariat from information provided mainly by the Secretariats
groupings. Data for GCC countries are compiled from a report of 1





























































Estimates of demand functions for
imports of individual LAFTA member
and nonmember countries; integra-
tion dummies are used, trade effects
are estimated as differences between
actual and hypothetical imports
Cross-sectional bilateral trade flow
model {gravity model); integration
dummies
Trade diversion measured as differ-
ence between absolute changes in
actual intra-LAFTA imports and those
changes which would have occurred
under constant share of intra-LAFTA
imports in total imports; thirty
three-digit SITC groups
Balassa approach: comparison of pre-
and post-integration ex post income
elasticities of import demand
Cross-sectional bilateral trade flow
model (gravity model); integration
dummies
Balassa approach (see above) for
durable and nondurable consumer
goods and intermediate goods
Net trade creation is measured as
growth of share of intraregional
imports in total domestic supply minus
decrease of share of extraregional
imports; trade diversion is defined
as extraregional import substitution












pansion was mainly due
to trade diversion;
75 per cent of esti-
mated diversion was
accounted for by Ar-
gentina: foreign ex-
change constraint ap-




defined as total in-
crease in intra-LAFTA




counts for the largest






of the CACM = increase
in the income elastic-



















tion was negligibleSynoptical Table A2 - Summary Records of Summit Meetings of Major Sub-Saharan African Integration
Schemes, 1985-1988
oo
Venue Participation (Heads of State) Problems stated Decisions taken








Senegal and Niger missing
Lack of financial controls; ab-
sence of viable management in
the overstaffed Secretariat; no
agreement on management report;
far-reaching corruption problems
Distribution conflicts between
Senegal and Ivory Coast on one
hand and Burkina Faso, Niger
and Mali on the other hand;
introduction of new barriers
(transit tax by Burkina Faso;
import ban on cotton and fruit)
No summit meeting in 1988
Members: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.







Swaziland, and Uganda were
Clearing house at the Reserve
Bank of Zimbabwe to maximise lo-
cal currency trade was used by
only six members and handled
only 4 per cent of total intra-
Adoption of new regional pro-
jects for commercial infor-
mation and documentation, and
for solar energy; budget of
the "Solidarity and Inter-
vention Fund for the Develop-
ment of the Community" adopt-
ed; no decision on integration
deepening
Solidarity Fund is placed di-
rectly under the authority of
the Secretariat instead of the
acting president of the Coun-
cil of Ministers; cut of the
operational budget by 10 per
cent
By 1989, a Community levy to
ensure the regional organis-
ation's own and permanent in-
come is to come into force
Discussion on reduction and
standardisation of tariffs on
a common list postponed; re-
duction of local ownership re-















only Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and
Zimbabwe, and Burundi were
present
Incomplete,
five out of 15 heads of state
were present
Incomplete,
eight heads of state were
Problems stated
regional trade; rules of origin
stipulating that exports eli-
gible for preferences must come
from businesses at least 51 per
cent locally owned were argued
to be too restrictive; payments
arrears
PTA Development Bank membership
not attractive; Mauritius left
the PTA; payments arrears
Clearing house still insuf-
ficiently used by member
countries
Decisions taken
to 30 per cent discussed
Three-tier system approved:
100 per cent preferential
treatment for companies with
minimum 51 per cent local
equity holding, 60 per cent
for companies between 41 and
50 per cent; 90 per cent for
companies between 30 and 40
per cent local equity;




10 per cent reduction annually
between 1988-1996; introduc-
tion of travellers' cheques in
PTA Currency Units (PTACU) to
ease commercial exchanges and
to set businessmen free from
the current restrictions; com-
munity sanctions against South
Africa deferred
PTA traveller cheques to be
introduced 1 August 1988, com-Synoptical Table A2 continued oo
00
Venue Participation (Heads of State) Problems stated Decisions taken
present pulsory for all travellers
within the area; sweeping
sanctions against South Africa
launched
Members: Botswana, Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe










Burundi, CAR, Chad, Rwanda, Sao
Tome
1 and Principe, Zaire were
missing
Complete
Budget contributions of member
states (arrears); free circu-
lation of persons in the ECCAS
controversially discussed
See above
See above; only four out of the
ten members had paid up
Programme of action approved
Budget approved for 1987; or-
ganisation for a trade fair in
Kinshasa in 1989 approved
Clearing house foundation has
been given "top priority"
Members: Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Sao Tome
1 and Principe, Zaire
19 December 1985
Souba/Gabon
Summary Record 1985-1988 of the Summit Meetings of the CACEU
Complete Free circulation of goods and ser- No relevant decision taken
vices still under scrutiny; free
movement of labour not agreed upon
by Cameroon and GabonSynoptical Table A2 continued






Cameroon, Congo and CAR were




of the Central African States'
Bank; no agreement launched on
free circulation of persons
within the region
Meeting approved a budget for
1988 down 22 per cent. No rel-
evant decision taken with
three of six heads absent
Members: Cameroon, Chad, Congo, CAR, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea




Ghana, Mauritania, Cape Verde,
and Guinea-Bissau were missing
30 June -
Abuja
2 July 1986 Incomplete,
Niger, Mali, Guinea, Ghana,
Ivory Coast were missing
Illegal immigrants expelled from
Nigeria violates Phase II of the
1979 immigration protocol which
allows ECOWAS citizens unlimited
residence in member states as
from 1985; implementation of the
protocol postponed until the
1986 summit
Arrears cumulated up to twice
the annual budget; telecommuni-
cation link-up project delayed
because of finanical shortages.
No decision taken on the econ-
omic recovery programme adopted
at the LomS Summit; bilateral
border conflicts; trade liberal-
isation remains a "dormant"
problematic issue; adopted
provisions have not been
implemented
Adoption of a plan to build
new headquarters for the
ECOWAS Secretariat and the
ECOWAS Fund for Cooperation;
setting up of a regional bank
with 20 per cent equity par-
ticipation of ECOWAS members;
ECOWAS telecommunication pro-
ject proceeds
Adoption of the "beginning of
the implementation of Phase II
of the protocol on free move-












Participation (Heads of State)
Incomplete,
Ghana, Niger, Guinea-Bissau,
Senegal, Guinea, Sierra Leone






No progress of trade liberalis-
ation; arrears remain unsettled
Decisions taken
Launching of the ECOWAS Recov-
ery Programme (money needed is
to be raised outside ECOWAS;
volume US $ 926 mill.); summit
confirmed the authorised capi-
tal of ECOWAS Fund as US $ 500
mill.; setting up of a West
African Health organisation
Opening of the ECOWAS Fund to
nonregional countries and in-
stitutions, cooperation agree-
ment with the African Develop-
ment Bank, cooperation start
with the World Bank; no
dumping of toxic and nuclear
waste in the region.
Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
Sumnary Record of 1985-1988 of Summit Meetings of the SADCC
Incomplete,
Malawi and Swaziland were
mi s s ing
Incomplete,
Malawi, Swaziland, and Lesotho
were missing
Disparity within SADCC towards
sanctions against South Africa
See above
No information
No informationSynoptical Table A2 continued




Malawi and Swaziland were
missing












Australia and other donors to
cede control over food to sup-
port SADCC's proposed US $ 208
mill, food reserve project;
concern of donors over
Zimbabwe's proposed extension of
energy supply from the Kariba
South hydroelectric station de-
spite the availability of sur-
plus electricity from the
Zambian side of the scheme
US $ 2500 mill, secured from
both local and foreign contri-
bution for the SADCC's US $
6000 mill, programme of action
(rehabilitation and improve-
ment of transport links to re-
gion's main ports of Maputo,
Beira, Nacala, Dar-es-Salam,
and Lobito); establishment of
SADCC Business Councils dis-
cussed; study on harmonisation
of investment codes to be com-
missioned
Botswana provides aid for the
rehabilitation of the Limpopo
railway
Fund raising of roughly US $ 1
bill, over the 1988-1991
period mainly for the trans-
port and communication sector.
Donors: EC members, Nordic
countries, Canada, Australia;
the US discuss the creation of
an export pre-financing re-
volving fund to overcome for-
eign exchange constraints in
Angola, Malawi, Mocambique and
Zambia; support pledged by
some donors for the Limpopo
railway rehabilitation project




Problems stated Foreign aid received Decisions taken
Summary Record of 1985-1987 of Suranit Meetings of the Senegal River Development Organisation
25-26 March 1985 Complete
Nouakchott
26-27 October 1987 Complete
Bamako
Members: Mali, Mauritania, Senegal
Serious financial diffi- French development aid
culties on the Manantali agency open up credits
Dam; Kuwait blocked for a total of 26 mill.
credit payments due to FF for Manantali
nonpayment of interest
by Mali and Mauritania
Disagreement between
Senegal and Mauritania
on the route of elec-
tricity lines serving




donors reluctant to give
priority to the navi-
gation phase of the
Diama and Manantali pro-




third phase of the
river development
programme - has been
given political pri-
ority
Source: Africa Research Bulletin [various issues].93
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